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ABSTRACT 
 Moral Theories can often place implausible demands upon agents, and these demands 
generally provide the criteria for the denial of such theories. In his book, On What Matters, 
Derek Parfit provides a systematic critique of subjective theories, and concludes that normative 
demands generated through subject-given reasons are both highly implausible, and logically 
incoherent, and thus it is incumbent upon philosophers to recognize them as inept in creating 
normative force. Through an analysis of the Deliberative Theory of subjectivism, Parfit provides 
three arguments; the Agony, All or None, and Incoherence Arguments which he claims 
undermine subjective theories.  
 In this thesis I argue that Parfit is mistaken in his view that Deliberative Subjectivists do 
not have a plausible response to Parfit’s critiques. Through the works of John Rawls, Bernard 
Williams, Michael Smith, and Christine Korsgaard, subjectivists can formulate a theory of 
deliberation which adequately responds to Parfit’s challenges. By combining the use of 
procedural rules, subject-given desires, and pre-analytic moral intuitions, subjectivists can 
provide an account of normativity that does not depend upon ideal deliberation, and thus 
circumnavigates the challenges raised through Parfit’s three arguments. 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In his book, On What Matters, Derek Parfit presents a systematic critique against 
subjective theories of normativity. Parfit develops four different formulations of subjectivism, 
the Desire-Based Theory, the Telic Desire Theory, the Error-Free Desire Theory, and the Informed 
Desire Theory before arriving at what he considers to be the most plausible and coherent 
version of subjectivism: the Deliberative Theory. The Deliberative Theory, which depends upon 
fully informed rational deliberation, appears to be the most plausible version of subjectivism, 
but its apparent internal consistency, according to Parfit, is due to its similarity to objective 
theories. The Deliberative Theory only appears to be plausible since the claims which 
subjectivists make through its use are similar to those that are generated through object-given 
theories.  
Although there are similarities in the reasons produced through the Deliberative Theory 
and Objectivist account of reasons, there is, however, a fundamental difference in how reasons 
are generated respectively through subject and object-given theories. The primary difference 
between the two types of theories is based upon the types of rationality that proponents of 
each theory appeal. Subjectivists appeal exclusively to rationality centered on procedural rules. 
The normative reasons generated through subject-given theories are based upon how we make 
our choices, and thus are primarily concerned with our deliberative processes. Objectivist 
theories, contrarily, appeal not only to how we make our choices, but also about what we 
actually choose. Object-given theories appeal to facts about the objects which we choose, and 
derive normativity out of those relevant facts.  
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Because Subjectivists only appeal to deliberative rules of procedure, Parfit claims that 
their theories can only ever be procedurally rational,1 whereas Objectivists appeal to both 
procedural rationality, and also, what Parfit calls, substantive rationality, (62) (those choices 
based upon facts). Since substantive rationality is not consistent with subjectivist theories, and 
thus principally unavailable for use in their justifications, subject-given theories often produce 
implausible or incoherent reasons which are unacceptable. These unacceptable reasons are 
generated out of the desires of agents who have desires for certain events which, no matter 
how implausible they may seem, Parfit claims, subjectivists must grant as normatively 
significant. Parfit contends that subjective theories do not have a plausible response to the 
Humean problem of desire (that all desires generate reasons), and thus subject-given theories 
produce many accounts of reasons which we in fact do not have. 
Objective theories, according to Parfit, do not generate implausible reasons, such as 
those of subject-given theories, because they do not just appeal to how we make our choices, 
but also what we choose. Object-given theories are not confined to merely procedural 
considerations, they may instead appeal to relevant facts about what we choose, and thus can 
make substantive claims about what we ought to do. By appealing to facts, which provide 
substantive justifications, as well as procedural rationality, Parfit believes that object-given 
theories provide a more coherent foundation for normativity. 
 Parfit claims, however, that subject-given theories are not merely less plausible then 
object-given account, they are false in two distinct ways: first, subjectivists cannot distinguish 
between those desires which generate reasons, and those which do not, and second, when 
                                                            
1 Derek Parfit, On What Matters, 62. Complete bibliographical details for this Thesis are provided in the 
Bibliography. Henceforth, numbers in parenthesis in this thesis refer to this book. 
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subjectivists appeal to fully informed deliberation (as they do in the Deliberative Theory) they 
are actually invoking object-given facts, and thus fail to be subject-given theories.  
Through what Parfit calls the Agony Argument and All or None Argument, he presents 
the inability of subjective theories to mitigate, and avoid the Humean problem. Instead, Parfit 
contends that subjectivists must claim that either all desires are capable of producing reasons, 
or none are. If subjectivists accept the former, then normativity would encompass all desires, 
and thus is a useless convention. Yet, if subjectivists accept the latter, as Parfit claims they 
should, then they cease to be subjectivists, but are rather adhering to some version of object-
given reasons. Parfit contends that the latter is the only plausible option open to subjectivists, 
and through the Incoherence Argument claims that this is in fact the route that most 
subjectivists, specifically deliberative subjectivists, such as Bernard Williams, John Rawls, and 
Michael Smith take.  
I will contend, however, that Parfit has a very limited understanding of what 
deliberative subjectivists are capable of accomplishing through the use of procedural 
rationality. I believe, instead, that deliberative subjectivists are under no obligation to accept 
the demand of fully informed deliberation, and that by replacing this demand, imposed by 
Parfit; they can provide a coherent account of normativity based exclusively upon procedural 
rules. I will draw upon the works of the aforementioned Williams, Rawls, and Smith to show 
that there are categorical demands placed upon rational agents, and that these demands fulfill 
the role of full information, thereby removing the necessary use of object-given facts which 
Parfit believes accompanies the use of fully informed deliberation.  
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By removing the need for ideal deliberation, such as Parfit views it, I believe that a more 
robust account of subjective deliberation can be provided. This robust account allows for a 
rejection of Parfit’s arguments about the falsity of Subjective Normativity, and thus allows 
subjectivists to maintain subject-given reasons as a plausible normative option. I do not 
specifically engage the debate of whether subject-given accounts of normativity are more 
plausible than object-given ones, but through this thesis it should be possible to see that 
Parfit’s critiques of subjectivism can be met in a substantial way, and that Parfit’s arguments do 
not in fact provide a fatal objection to subjectivism.   
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CHAPTER 1: SUBJECTIVE NORMATIVITY 
In the first volume of his book On What Matters, Derek Parfit presents an account of 
morality which grounds normativity solidly within an Objectivist framework. For Parfit, what we 
have reason to do ultimately derives from what certain relevant facts dictate in any situation. 
These facts should be seen as exclusively object-given, since they are about the objects of our 
desires, and are telic2 in nature. Therefore, when making moral claims, Parfit concludes that we 
must reject subjective theories, which ground normativity in facts that appeal exclusively to our 
“present desires, aims, and choices.” (58) 
According to Parfit, reasons which are instrumental, or are conditionally dependent 
upon telic desires, are unable to generate normative force, and as such should be regarded as 
impotent in creating obligation. Since instrumental or conditionally dependent reasons, which 
are based upon desire, are unable to provide normative reasons, Parfit claims that we must 
reject subjective notions of normativity. I believe that this rejection of desire-based reasons 
overlooks fundamental characteristics of rational human ontology, but my immediate purpose 
is not to refute Parfit’s account of normativity, but rather to present an exegetically accurate 
account of Parfit’s rejection of subjective theories.  
For Parfit, subjectivist theories of morality focus on our present desires and aims when 
establishing normativity. These theories “appeal to facts” about how we produce reasons which 
are generated exclusively out of “present desires, aims, and choices.” (58) Although there are 
wide-ranging accounts of subjective notions of right action, Parfit begins with what he sees as 
the most basic subjective theory which can be formulated as follows, 
                                                            
2 Parfit defines telic desires as those which we have “when we want some event as an end.” (58) 
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The Desire-Based Theory: We have a reason to do, whatever 
would fulfill any of our present desires. (58) 
 
This formulation of Subjectivism implies that we have reasons to act upon any present 
desires, that implication, however, must be seen as false. If all desires generated normative 
reasons, then we would be committed to acting upon desires which are contrary to some of our 
actual long-term goals or aims.  Rather, “For subjective theories to be plausible… they must 
admit that some desires do not give us reasons.”(58) For example 
Suppose that, while walking in some desert, you have disturbed 
and angered a poisonous snake. You believe that, to save your 
life, you must run away. In fact you must stand still, since this 
snake will attack only moving targets. (34) 
 
If we accept the Desire-Based Theory the agent who is confronted with the poisonous 
snake must claim that he has a reason to run away which is generated by his current desire to 
run away. This current desire is, however, based off a false belief and will not accomplish his 
supposed end of not dying. Presumably, if he correctly understood that running away would 
cause the snake to bite, he would not maintain his present desire to run away. Instead, he 
would desire to stay still since that is the only way to save his life. However, if the Desire-Based 
Theory is correct, this fully informed desire of not running is not open to this agent because it is 
not his present desire, and thus fails to generate a reason for action. It seems highly implausible 
that the agent confronted with the snake can claim that he had a reason to run, since this 
reason is only used as a means to accomplish his goal of saving his life. Yet, if the agent has a 
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desire to run, and this desire is incapable of generating a reason, this seems to seriously hinder 
the subjectivist claim that reasons are dependent upon our present desires and aims.3  
Since subjectivist theories depend upon desires in order to generate reasons, yet some 
desires are unable to provide reasons, there must be a way to distinguish between the two. 
This is done by drawing a distinction between telic desires, and instrumental desires. Parfit 
claims that “Desires are telic when we want some event as an end, or for its own sake, and 
instrumental when we want some event as a means to some end.” (58) This distinction allows 
us to claim that when considering instrumental desires, we do not have a desire for the thing 
which is instrumental, but rather due to its ability to provide us the thing which is the actual 
source of our desire. Instrumental desires do not provide reasons because they are merely a 
conduit to fulfill our actual desires. If there were other equally plausible ways to fulfill these 
desires, we may have no preference for any one instrument, and thus our desire in wanting this 
thing holds only insofar as it allows us to achieve some other end. We do not therefore have a 
desire for this instrumental thing independently, or for its own sake, and thus we should reject 
the notion that these desires provide reasons.   
Desires that are instrumental thus fail to generate reasons; rather, instrumental desires 
should be seen as components of those reasons that are generated in response to a given telic 
desire. Of the two types of desires, only telic desires generate reasons for action, and so we can 
reformulate the Desire-Based Theory as, 
                                                            
3 As will be claimed in Chapter 3, this is what will be explained as the Humean Problem. Since David Hume held the 
view that all desires generate reasons, the name of this problem is attributed to him. It is important to note here, 
that the contention Parfit invokes against this problem is that we should see it as an implausible feature of 
Subjective notions of normativity that all desires generate reasons. If we accept that all desires generate reasons 
we would often have reasons to perform many actions which run contrary to any plausible conception of right 
action, but yet nevertheless we have a desire to perform., and therefore according to Hume a reason to do. 
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The Telic Desire Theory: We have most reason to do whatever 
would best fulfill or achieve our present telic desires or aims. (59) 
 
This formulation of Subjectivism correctly implies that it is ultimately only our telic 
desires that provide reasons. However, within the parameters of the Telic-Desire Theory listed 
above, in cases where our aims depend on false beliefs, we arrive at unsatisfactory conclusions. 
For example, as Parfit writes, “I might want to hurt you…because I falsely believe that you 
deserve to suffer, or because I want to avenge some injury that I falsely believe you have done 
me.”(60) In such cases if the Telic Desire Theory is correct I would correspondingly have a 
reason to hurt you because that conforms to my telic desire, but this is a conclusion which 
seems illogical, since I, in fact, have no reason to hurt you since my desire is wrong or 
misplaced.  
 To avoid cases such as the one above, Subjectivists may appeal to desires which are 
error-free or which are dependent upon true beliefs. Through an appeal to desires free from 
error, the Telic-Desire Theory can be reformulated as, 
The Error-Free Desire theory: We have most reason to do 
whatever would best fulfill or achieve our present error-free telic 
desires. (60) 
 
The error-free telic formulation of the Desire-Based Theory avoids the necessitation that 
all desires provide reasons because it appeals only to those desires which are error-free. In 
situations like the above example, although I have a desire to harm you, this desire is based on 
a false belief and thus does not generate a reason to act upon my misinformed desire. 
Although this formulation avoids the overbroad encompassing of all desires of the 
Desire-Based Theory, as well as the susceptibility to false beliefs of the Telic-Desire Theory, it is 
still fairly weak in its current state. The Error-Free Desire Theory can be strengthened in a 
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significant way with a further distinction: that our desires be fully informed. We have already 
seen that desires that are based on false belief provide insufficient grounding for reasons, but 
we should also recognize that desires based on ignorance succumb to this critique as well. For 
example, in the case in which I want to cause you harm, “I might believe falsely that you have 
intentionally injured me; or, though believing truly that you have injured me, I might not know 
that your aim was to save me from some greater injury.” (60) In such cases I cannot appeal to 
my false belief of your intention to injure me, since unbeknownst to me you did not intend to 
inflict injury upon me. Furthermore, there is something intuitively wrong with claiming that I 
actually ought to fulfill my ignorant desire to harm you when this ignorance is about the fact 
that the harm you did me was designed to keep me from greater injury. In this case, I would not 
have erred in my assessment of the fact that you harmed me, but I would be ignorant of the 
greater harm I was saved from by your action. For this reason it seems most plausible to appeal 
to telic desires that are fully informed as well as free from error. An appeal to fully-informed 
desire generates,  
The Informed Desire Theory: we have most reason to do whatever 
would best fulfill the telic desires or aims that we would now have 
if we knew all of the relevant facts. (61) 
 
The appeal to the Informed Desire Theory involves, however, several problematic notions. First: 
through an appeal to “all of the relevant facts” it appears as though (1) all facts that may alter 
our present desires are relevant, and (2) by appealing to desire that is fully informed we are 
dismissing our actual desires in lieu of potential desires. 
 As Parfit claims (1) is too wide of a criterion. (61) Drawing upon an analysis by Allan 
Gibbard, we must restrict our requirement of being fully informed to only currently relevant 
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facts. For example, as Gibbard claims, if we were hungry and had the desire to eat, yet, “if we 
knew and vividly imagined the full facts about what is going on in the innards of our fellow-
diners, we might lose our desire to eat.” (61) Instead we must restrict the scope of what fact 
must be considered to only those facts which have a bearing on our present desires, such as 
when experiencing the desire to eat, knowing the relevant facts of how to accomplish this in a 
plausible way. All facts that may affect a desire are not relevant, such as the gastro-intestinal 
status of a fellow diner when I have the desire of hunger, but rather only those which have a 
sufficiently useful bearing upon any present desire. Therefore we should restrict the use of 
relevant facts to those facts which if known would alter our desires. These facts, however, are 
logically linked with our desire in such a way that we would consider such a  fact an 
immediately pertinent fact in determining what our present desire ought to be. 
 (2) is necessarily problematic to subjectivists since it dismisses an agent’s actual desires, 
and depends solely upon their potentially fully informed desires. Although plausible theories of 
morality depend upon ideal agents4, not merely actual agents, an appeal to fully informed 
desire eliminates the reason generating capacity of desire. If only fully informed desires are 
capable of generating reasons, then it becomes unclear as to how this account of subjectivism 
can plausibly be used in understanding normativity.  
The Informed Desire Theory would depend upon omniscient beings in founding 
normativity, since only an agent who is fully informed may generate reasons for action, 
according to this theory. An agent lacking possession of the relevant facts may be able to align 
                                                            
4 Such an agent who is fully informed and fulfills an acceptable conception of rationality. 
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herself with what she would choose if she were fully informed, but lacking this fully informed 
state she could not generate reasons to act this way.  
For example, if the previous agent who falsely wants to harm you decides out of a 
benevolent desire to refrain from injuring you, this would be in conformity with a fully informed 
state where she knew the relevant facts and knew that you were innocent. If we suppose the 
fully informed agent would decide you should not be harmed, this generates a reason for them 
not to harm you. The same cannot be said about their newly found benevolent nature in an 
uninformed state. In the uninformed state the agent would believe that you are worthy of 
injury, but refrains from injuring you due to a benevolent impulse. This would fail to generate a 
reason for not harming you, since if the Informed Desire Theory is correct given the relevant 
facts she would not need to be benevolent since you are innocent of their rebuke. Although the 
uninformed and fully informed states would present the same outcome, according to this 
theory you could only have a reason to act in the fully informed state.    
If fully informed desires are the singular type of desires that may generate reasons, and 
we wish to apply this subjective theory to actual agents, we arrive at an apparent inability to 
generate reasons of any kind. Since actual agents are distinguished from ideal agents in the 
simple fact that they lack the omniscient characteristic which we can assume for the ideal 
agent, the Informed Desire Theory although potentially applicable in theory, degenerates into a 
useless principle when applied to actual agents. Since by the very distinction of being actual 
agents, existent agents are unable to be fully informed, the Informed Desire Theory is at best a 
hypothetical theory that can have very little practical application. 
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Since the Informed Desire Theory depends upon a full understanding of the relevant 
facts, yet the definition of the relevant facts appear to be slightly ambiguous (1), and the 
acquisition of these facts is a dubious possibility (2), it is more plausible for subjectivists to 
redirect their focus from “what would best fulfill or achieve our desires or aims… to the choices 
or decisions that we would make after carefully considering the [relevant] facts.” (61) By 
focusing upon the choices or decisions we would make after ideal deliberation, when 
possessing all of the relevant facts, Subjectivists may be able to avoid the problems generated 
through (1) and (2), and thus maintain a subjective approach to reasons. According to what 
Parfit calls, 
The Deliberative Theory (DT): We have most reason to do 
whatever, after fully informed and rational deliberation, we would 
choose to do. (62) 
  
Unlike the previous four versions of subjectivism DT does not appeal to desire, but rather what 
we would choose to do. Although what we may desire and what we would choose may often be 
similar or analogous, they may not always be, and because of this the DT at least partially 
avoids the objections of (1) and (2) above. 
 Since Parfit views DT as the strongest version of Subjectivism, and tailors many of his 
remarks to counter DT, I will explicate in detail here how it works, and how it differs from its 
apparent objectivist counterpart (C), 
(C) What we have most reason to do, or decisive reason to do, is 
the same as what, if we were fully informed and rational, we 
would choose to do. (62) 
 
DT states that “We have most reason to do whatever, after fully informed and rational 
deliberation, we would choose to do.” (62) Parfit claims that at first glance this is a view which 
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would be acceptable to Objectivists, since Objectivists may claim adherence to (C), which is 
strikingly similar to DT. Parfit concludes that this similarity is, however, at best “ambiguous,” 
since claiming that both Subjectivists and Objectivists may appeal to specific types of 
deliberation adds very little to any proposed distinction between the two.  
 Although DT and (C) appear to be ambiguously related we can distinguish them in a 
useful way due to the fact that DT is concerned with what we can rationally choose, and not 
merely about what we desire, like the other Subjectivist theories. Since DT focuses upon what 
we would rationally choose after careful deliberation, it appeals to a sense of rationality that is 
unavailable to the other theories, and thus shares a commonality with (C).  The form of 
deliberation which DT depends upon is an adherence to certain types of procedural rules, or 
rather procedural rationality. As Parfit claims, “we ought to try to imagine fully the important 
effects of our different possible acts, to avoid wishful thinking, to assess probabilities correctly, 
and to follow certain other procedural rules.” (62) When we deliberate in ways which adhere to 
procedural rules about necessary instrumental actions we are procedurally rational. 
 DT claims that we have most reason to do what we would choose after fully informed 
and rational deliberation. In order to satisfy the requirement of rational deliberation an agent 
must meet certain rational limits when making choices. When choosing, in order to meet the 
standards of procedural rationality, “we ought to imagine fully the important effects of our 
different possible acts, to avoid wishful thinking, to assess probabilities correctly, and to follow 
certain other procedural rules.” (62) When pursuing our aims, whatever they may be, it is not 
only logical that Deliberative Subjectivists adhere to procedural rationality, but necessary, as 
Bernard Williams, one such subjectivist claims, when making choices, we must have “a desire 
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not to fail through error.” (77) Therefore, Subjectivists operating under the DT are acting 
rationally, and appear to be in conformity with (C) 
As has been shown, Subjectivists must appeal to a deliberative process in a procedurally 
rational way. Procedural necessitations appear to be a minimal threshold for rationality, but 
appealing to procedural rules does not inherently imply that DT has the same qualifying reasons 
for support as the Objectivist, which adheres to (C). Instead, Parfit contends that Subjectivists 
are not truly in conformity with (C) since they are unable to depend upon substantive claims. 
Although Subjectivists may be acting rationally when following procedural rules, or acting with 
a consistency and adherence, for example, to the desire not to fail through error, they are 
excluded from substantive appeals since appeals to desire are devoid of object-given reasons.5 
Since the Subjectivists cannot depend upon object-given reasons they must ground 
rational deliberation within the framework of consistency of action, or upon “how we make our 
choices.” (62) Therefore although Subjectivists would most likely accept (C) they would do so 
for a very different reason than Objectivists. Subjectivists would accept (C) because it is what an 
agent acting on subjective principles would desire to choose after ideal deliberation, 
Objectivists conversely would accept (C) because, as Parfit claims, there are object-given facts 
and acting upon (C) would then be what we have decisive reason to do, when in possession of 
these facts.  
Objectivists appeal to procedural rationality, and it is because of this that (C) originally 
seems equally as pleasing to them, but Objectivists require a further standard in order to accept 
this claim. Unlike the Subjectivists, for the Objectivists it is not enough that we act procedurally 
                                                            
5 Object-given reasons will be fleshed out in chapter 2. 
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rationally and have consistency between our intentions and beliefs, we must also be 
substantively rational. To be substantively rational there must be object-given reasons which 
are derived from the relevant reason-giving facts. These facts are not open to Subjectivists since 
for Subjectivists reasons depend upon desires, and cannot be drawn from objectively given 
facts. “These people [Subjectivists] deny that we have such object-given reasons, and they 
appeal to claims that are only about procedural rationality.” (62) Objectivists must not only 
follow the dictates of procedural rationality, but must also appeal to “strong and often decisive 
object-given reasons.” (62)  
We can more clearly distinguish these two viewpoints if we return to our snake example 
from earlier. According to the Objectivist the fact that running will cause the snake to attack, 
and thus bite me which will lead to my death, gives me a decisive reason to want to remain still, 
and as Parfit says, “If I were fully informed and substantively rational, that is what I would 
choose to do.” (63) The Subjectivist reverses this relationship, and only claims that we have a 
decisive reason not to run after implementing the desire to not run, which is only possible after 
ideal deliberation. If after “fully informed and procedurally rational deliberation,” (63) I would 
choose to not run, Deliberative Subjectivists would then agree that I have a decisive reason to 
not run.  
However, the Subjectivist uses the fact that running will cause the snake to bite to 
inform their course of action, only after imposing their pre-existing desire to not die upon the 
situation. The Subjectivist can be seen to be procedurally rational since they have some desire 
(to not die) and the facts provide the right course of action to satisfy that desire (not running). 
Yet the decisive reason for the Subjectivist is only supplied in accordance with the consistency 
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between their intentions or desires (not to die) and their beliefs (that staying still will keep the 
snake docile).  
Conversely, Objectivists instead rely foremost upon the fact that running will cause the 
snake to bite, but rather than just needing this to be procedurally rational and consistent with 
their intention (to not die), Objectivists must also submit this intention to the object-given fact 
that it is normatively true that we have reasons to live. These reasons are supplied by 
substantive object-given facts which are unobtainable for subjectivists, and thus cannot provide 
normative foundations.  
Even though both Objectivists and Subjectivists ultimately accept (C), they do so for 
different reasons. “Objectivists appeal to normative claims about what, after ideal deliberation, 
we have reasons to choose, and ought rationally to choose. These [Deliberative] Subjectivists 
appeal to psychological claims about what, after such deliberation we would in fact choose.” 
(63) If Subjectivists, for example, lacked the desire to not die, even after ideal deliberation, they 
would be unable to claim decisive reason to not run, since subjectivists lack the ability to grasp 
object-given substantive reasons. Although most Subjectivists would presumably have the long-
term aim to not die, since this is not a current desire (as will be seen in Chapter 2) they would 
not produce a reason to stand still, unless that was already a desire which they possessed. 
Objectivists, conversely, which lack the desire to live, would still be bound to object-given facts 
when deliberating, and as such ought to still decisively conclude a need to not run.  
Parfit presents Deliberative Subjectivism as the most plausible subjective theory of 
reasons. However, according to Parfit, this theory fails to motivate substantive reasons because 
it depends wholly upon procedural accounts of normativity. Subjectivists “believe that all 
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practical reasons are desire-based, aim-based, or choice-based,” (65) and since this is so widely 
accepted, Parfit asks, “how could it be true that, as objective theories claim, there are no such 
reasons?” (65) 
Parfit claims that there are many “partial explanations” for why so many people falsely 
believe that we can have desire, aim, or choice-based reasons. Since subjectivism is so widely 
held it is useful to explain why so many people accept this theory, even though, according to 
Parfit, we have no such subjective reasons.  
Many of the reasons that subjectivists claim for why desire can be a normative tool are 
due to simple misunderstandings, or confusion about the basis for our reasons. First, for 
example, it is often the case that what we desire is valuable in its own right, and because of 
this, subjectivists may claim that it is then a substantive desire. This is false though; rather, we 
have an object-given reason to fulfill this desire, or to perform this action, and so although the 
subjectivist is right in claiming that we have a reason to act, it is due to an object-given fact, not 
a subject-given desire.  
Second, we may have a desire “because we believe that we have such reasons.”(65) 
When we have a desire that is generated through the belief that we have reasons for action, 
any reason that may be generated is due to this belief, and not some desire that we may have 
(this will be clearly shown in Chapter 2). This approach confuses desire with belief, and mistakes 
desire for that which generates reasons in these circumstances. 
Third, many people believe that desires which contribute to our well-being are in 
themselves good for us. Yet, what is truly good for us is the promotion of our well-being, and 
the desire which achieves this is merely an instrumental tool to satisfy this requirement. When 
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the fulfillment of a desire positively affects our well-being, we have reason to fulfill this desire 
solely because we have value-based reasons, not because a desire can be in itself good.  
Fourth, many people do not distinguish between the fact that many desires produce 
motivational reasons for action, and the fact that these motivational reasons are not 
normative. Often these two forms of reasons are confused, even though motivational and 
normative reasons are distinctly disparate. (66) 
Fifth, desires can be seen as normative when they are derivative in the sense that the 
reasons which they produce derive entirely from the facts that gave me my reasons to fulfill 
some desire. Therefore, although there are certain desires which are needed when trying to 
accomplish some substantive goals, these desires are contingently necessary, and thus do not 
fulfill the broader scope of normativity which Parfit is addressing when he is addressing our 
“primary, non-derivative reasons.” (66) 
Sixth, “when we could fulfill other people’s desires or help these people to achieve their 
aims, these facts may give us non-derivative reasons to act in these ways.” (66) Even though 
many people often have desires which they have no reason to fulfill, when we help others in 
achieving their aims “we respect these people’s autonomy, and avoid paternalism.” (66) Since 
our autonomy is a substantive good which we need in order for normativity to be possible, we 
have substantive reasons to help others express autonomous action. 
Seventh, people often confuse what we ought rationally to do with what we have 
reasons to do. Although, for example, it may be rational for the agent to run away from the 
snake, he does not have a reason to. We may act rationally in many situations where we are 
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ignorant of certain facts, but we are often acting in ways which are counter to what we have 
reason to do. 
Eighth, we often claim to have reasons to fulfill some present desire that is aimed at 
future situations, or experiences that we believe we will enjoy. “But these reasons are 
provided, not by the fact that we would be fulfilling these desires, but by the fact that we would 
enjoy these future activities or experiences.” (67) Instead, as we will see in the next chapter, 
“such facts give us reasons that are hedonic rather than desire-based.” (67) 
Ninth, some people falsely believe that hedonic reasons are desire-based. Whereas it 
will be shown in Chapter 2 that hedonic likings or dislikings are responses to sensations, and 
that when these people claim that our desires give us reasons they are in fact referring to our 
meta-hedonic desires.  
Tenth, “we have many reasons for acting that we wouldn’t have if we didn’t have 
certain desires. But these reasons are provided, not by the facts that our acts would fulfill these 
desires, but by certain other facts that causally depend on our having these desires.” (67) For 
example, when we play some games, “we have no reason to want to win. But if we do want to 
win, that may make it true that we would enjoy winning, and this second fact would then give 
us a reason to try to fulfill this desire.”(68) As will be provided shortly, the ‘second fact’ that 
gives us reasons to fulfill this desire is provided by a value-based hedonic reason. Our desires 
may generate facts which provide reasons to fulfill these desires, but these facts although 
dependent upon the desires, are aimed at our having mental states that we enjoy. Since these 
desires then are derivative in the sense that they are aimed at the states which we enjoy (which 
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are value-based) these desires do not provide reasons, but rather achieving these positive 
mental-states is what provides reasons. 
Many of the mistaken accounts of reasons which subjectivists hold revolve around 
confusion about the fact that our desires are usually derivative and thus although they provide 
us with motivating reasons, they do not provide normative reasons. We often have many 
reasons to fulfill our desires or aims, but these reasons are provided, “not by the fact that we 
would be fulfilling these desires or aims, but by such other desire-dependent or aim-dependent 
facts.” (69) Much of the time when subjectivists claim that desires or aims provide us with 
reasons, “it is often such other facts that they really have in mind.” (69) When many 
subjectivists hold plausible beliefs about which facts generate normative actions, “they have 
merely failed to see that these beliefs do not in fact support any subjective theory.” (70) 
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CHAPTER 2: OBJECTIVE NORMATIVITY 
As an Objectivist, Parfit depends upon the dualistic approach to rationality described in 
the previous chapter. This approach is comprised of an insistence upon substantive rationality 
in conjunction with procedural rationality when generating reasons for action. Although it will 
be shown that Parfit considers substantive rationality to be the foundation of normativity, we 
must nevertheless also be procedurally rational when acting on substantive facts, and thus 
these two must work in tandem to provide reasons for action. The task of this chapter will first 
be to differentiate these forms of rationality, followed by an analysis of how facts properly 
ground all of normativity.  
As has been shown, procedural rationality is merely a rational coherence placed upon 
our means of achieving whatever aims we pursue. Procedural rules pertain to rationality only 
insofar as our actions coincide with what our intentions dictate. Procedural rationality often has 
very little to do with the aim of an individual, but rather with the means of achieving those 
aims. As Rawls claims, “knowing that people are rational, we do not know the ends they will 
pursue, only that they will pursue them intelligently.”6 
It is possible, therefore, to be procedurally rational and yet act contrary to the aims that 
would exist if an agent was substantively rational. For example, the mistaken agent who falsely 
desires to injure another whom he believes wronged him may be procedurally rational when 
deciding and acting upon the best way to cause harm to the other, but he may in fact be acting 
counter to the desire which he would have if he possessed all of the facts. Therefore although 
procedural rules may be adhered to in a logical way, no matter their aims, it is because they 
                                                            
6 John Rawls. A Theory of Justice.  49. Henceforth numbers in parenthesis with the prefix R in this thesis refer to 
this book. 
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lack substantive grounding that Subjectivists fail to provide normativity. Instead, as Parfit 
claims, in order to gain a substantive foundation for normativity we must base normativity not 
only upon what is rational, but upon object-given facts. These object-given facts are the 
underlying foundation for all reasons because they provide a basic irrefutable reality upon 
which normativity can be structured. Unlike procedural rules which provide hypothetical or 
conditional imperatives, substantive appeals depend upon object-given facts that are 
unconditioned and this provides a basis for morality that transcends the individual subjective 
aims that agents may have. Therefore, substantive appeals are capable of providing a 
normative framework which is independent of desire, and presents an agent with what they 
ought to do simply by appealing to the relevant reason-implying facts. 
Since Parfit’s account of normativity is established primarily through an appeal to 
substantive object-given facts, and these facts are what allow for the generation of reasons, it 
must be shown precisely how these facts supply us with reasons. In what follows I will present 
Parfit’s account of objectivity as it pertains to reasons, and why reasons are inextricably linked 
with facts. 
For Parfit, “the concept of a reason is indefinable in the sense that it cannot be helpfully 
explained merely by using words” (31), and as such the only way in which reasons may be 
understood in an intelligible way is to understand how they are created: by object-given facts. 
Since, “Reasons are given by facts”, in order to understand the way in which reasons are given 
by or through facts, the various types of reasons that we may have (decisive, strongly decisive, 
actual, and apparent) must be delineated, as well as, how, based upon the relevant facts we 
may distinguish between these in a meaningful way.  
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 All normative reasons arise from the relevant reason-giving facts which are present in 
any given situation (34). Therefore in order to explicate how facts may be reason-giving it must 
first be shown how facts operate in Parfit’s view of morality, and second, how an agent may 
interact with facts in such a way that facts alone may provide normativity.  
Facts, for Parfit, are simply those objective realities that are impartially true and as such 
have the ability to determine reasons. For example, if we return to the agent confronted by a 
poisonous snake, there are simple facts that the snake will bite the agent if he runs, and there is 
a fact that remaining still will result in the snake staying docile. These facts are true irrespective 
of any belief, whether true or false, that the agent may have, and as such generate reasons for 
action that are grounded solely in these realities.  
Although facts alone provide reasons, within any situation there are many types of facts, 
some of which have no bearing upon what we ought to do, and so we must distinguish facts in 
a useful way when discussing normativity. Some facts although true and accessible to an agent 
have no relation to what we ought to do: for example, the agent in front of the snake can be 
wearing shorts, or a dress, neither of which affect what he ought to do when confronted by the 
snake. Therefore, we must restrict the scope of inquiry to only what Parfit calls the “relevant, 
reason-giving facts.” (34) All of the facts which provide normative reasons in any given situation 
are known as the relevant reason-giving facts. These facts have a distinct ability to generate 
reasons not only due to their true nature, but also to their applicability in affecting what we 
ought to do in a normative sense. 
Once extraneous facts are excluded, an agent who examines only the relevant facts 
would properly understand that standing still is the only possible action which will result in 
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their life being spared. There are the relevant facts that the agent desires to live,7 that if bitten 
the agent will die, and that the snake will only bite if the agent runs. These facts, when 
combined, provide the cohesive fact that only staying still will ensure the snake not biting, 
which thus results in a reason to stay still.  These facts are reason-giving, since irrespective of 
any beliefs, the agent may appeal to these facts and thus correctly infer that what he or she 
ought to do is stay still. 
The relevant facts from the snake example conform together to provide a normative 
answer to the agent confronted with the poisonous snake. These facts work in conjunction with 
each other to provide the agent with an understanding of what they ought to do. Yet, not all 
facts in a given scenario often lend themselves to a cohesive conclusion. It is possible, for 
example, for facts to conflict, such as, “If I enjoy walnuts, this fact gives me a reason to eat 
them; but if they would kill me, this fact gives me a stronger or weightier conflicting reason not 
to eat them.” (32) When facts conflict, there must be various criterion which can be used to 
judge them, such that we can determine what we have most reason to do. Reasons thus should 
be seen as often falling into categories of degrees when one has conflicting reasons for action; 
these categories are of “force, strength, or weight.” (32)   
Since reasons can be differentiated by degree, when we have conflicting reasons, “If our 
reasons to act in some way are stronger than our reasons to act in any of the other possible 
ways, these reasons are decisive, and acting in this way is what we have most reason to do.” 
(32)  If these reasons are stronger than all others, then they are called “strongly decisive” 
                                                            
7 Parfit claims that we can establish all reasons, even those pertaining to desires, “as being provided by certain 
facts, such as facts about our desires, or about the wrongness of some act,” (45). 
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reasons, and “when we have decisive reasons, or most reason, to act in some way, this act is 
what we should or ought to do in what we can call the decisive-reason-implying senses.” (33)  
Reasons that are decisive provide what we have most reason to do: this distinction, 
however, implies that we may also have reasons to act upon facts in a way other than what is 
decisive. These auxiliary reasons, though, are subjugated to those which are strongly decisive, 
and in this way in any situation we usually have exactly one decisive course of action. There 
may be cases in which we have two or more possible reasons that are equally acceptable for an 
agent to choose; in these cases a decisive reason does not exist, but rather the agent has 
“sufficient reasons, or enough reason, to act in any of two or more ways.” (32) This lack of 
decisiveness within some scenarios, as well as the fact that, “though there are truths about the 
relative strength of different reasons, these truths are often very imprecise,” (33) produces an 
allusiveness in determining what we have decisive reason to do.  
 Since we are often unable to determine what we have decisive reason to do, when we 
are “asking what we ought to do in the decisive-reason-implying sense… [we should also be 
concerned with]…what we ought rationally to do.” (33) As actual, imperfect agents, which are 
not always or perhaps even often perceptive of all of the reason-giving facts, we are capable of 
rationally acting in procedural ways that are not supported by facts. Parfit must then present us 
with an account of rational action when an agent is unaware of some or all of the relevant facts. 
In order for a normativity based upon facts to be seen as practically applicable, it must contain 
provisions for right action when some or all of the facts are obscured, or misunderstood by 
actual agents, and thus Parfit must appeal to more than just fully informed ideal reasons in 
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determining what we ought to do; otherwise Parfit’s account of normativity will not be a 
significant improvement over DT. 
Parfit appeals to belief in providing a view of rational action which does not depend 
solely upon facts but which is still able to apply to actual agents, not just ideal agents. Belief 
allows for rational action since it does not depend upon facticity, but rather only necessitates 
an appeal to procedural rationality. As has already been shown, procedurally rational action 
does not focus upon one’s aims, but rather their means, and thus maintains the label of rational 
as long as there is consistency in one’s actions. Since belief does not depend upon factitious 
justification, as long an action stemming from any belief is procedurally accurate then this 
action is rational. However, even though belief is most often rational, it may nonetheless lack 
substantive foundations. Therefore, the reasons generated through belief must be separated 
into two categories, apparent and real reasons. These two categories both allow for rational 
belief, yet only the latter is guaranteed to contain substantive qualities.  
Apparent reasons are those which are based upon beliefs “whose truth would give us a 
reason to act in some way.” (35) Apparent reasons are generated by beliefs, which implies that 
they do not necessarily correlate to facts. Since apparent reasons are based on beliefs, they are 
generated equally from true or false beliefs. However, when the beliefs, upon which an 
apparent reason are grounded are false, it results in what may be called a “merely-apparent 
reason” (35) which, although possibly procedurally rational, does not provide reasons with 
normative force since it necessarily lacks facticity. If, however, the beliefs which an apparent 
reason depend upon are true, then “this apparent reason is also a real reason.” (35)  
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Belief is able to rationally supply us with merely apparent, and real reasons alike due to 
our un-ideal state as actual beings. Since we seldom know all of the relevant facts, belief plays a 
major role in what it would be rational for us to do. Only facts generate real reasons, due to 
their true nature, but we may still be acting rationally when we act upon merely apparent 
reasons, since we are often limited due to our lack of access to facts. Therefore, although 
possibly lacking normative force, all rational beliefs provide us with a form of reasons. 
Yet, even though all real reasons are also necessarily apparent reasons, they differ 
significantly since apparent reasons do not necessitate real reasons. Only apparent reasons 
whose beliefs are true provide real, or decisive reasons, because they correlate to relevant 
reason-implying facts. Apparent reasons, conversely whose beliefs may correlate falsely to 
facts, may only be seen as merely apparent, and thus do not generate actual reasons. Real 
reasons are thus the only reasons which generate normativity, since they alone necessarily 
adhere to facts, which, according to Parfit, is the sole criterion for normativity. Because real 
reasons are those which adhere to facts and correspondingly generate normativity, real reasons 
are also the only reasons which may be decisive, in the decisive reason-implying sense.  
 Although decisive reasons are only generated through apparent reasons that are also 
real reasons, Parfit claims that both types of reasons, even though not decisive, may at the very 
least be understood as providing rational reasons. Parfit says that, “what it would be rational 
for people to do depends upon their apparent reasons, whether or not these reasons are real, 
or merely apparent.” (35)  Rationality depends solely upon an agent’s ability to avoid “certain 
kinds of inconsistency and other mismatches between [their] intentions, beliefs, and other 
mental states.”(36)  Although an agent may act rationally as long as he maintains procedural 
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rationality, Parfit is clear that they do not successfully generate real, and more importantly, 
decisive reasons without true beliefs. It is for this reason alone, that, according to Parfit, 
subjectivists cannot supply us with a normative framework for action. Subjectivists situate their 
view of normativity exclusively within procedural accounts, and because of this, true beliefs, or 
as we shall see substantive beliefs, are not open to them. 
 All apparent reasons have the potential to be not only rational, but also decisive 
reasons. Merely apparent reasons, however, fail to motivate actual reasons, not because they 
are irrational, but rather due to their lack of adherence to relevant-facts. Therefore, although 
all apparent reasons have the potential to be rational, because merely apparent reasons lack 
facticity, they are unable to provide normativity. By appealing to substantive rationality Parfit 
presents an object-given solution to this lack of facticity found in merely apparent reasons 
which succeeds in generating real apparent reasons. Real reasons depend upon beliefs which 
are true, and since procedural rationality cannot determine the facticity of beliefs, only the 
means to achieving whatever aims an agent may have, the combination of procedural and 
substantively rational operations must be performed in conjunction in order to establish 
normativity. Parfit claims that when an agent is procedurally rational and bases his beliefs upon 
substantively rational facts then he generate normatively powerful reasons. Real reasons are 
thus generated through consistent adherence to true beliefs which are true solely because of 
their connection to the relevant reason implying facts. 
 For Parfit, reasons are intrinsically linked with facts, and this adherence to facts provides 
objective grounding for right action. Parfit claims that we ought “to reject all subjective 
theories, and accept some objective theory. [Since] our practical reasons are all object-given 
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and value-based.” (65)8 Object-given, or practical moral foundations, are claimed to be superior 
to Subjective accounts, since practical reasons generate real reasons that are telic. Subjectivists 
instead claim that “our reasons for acting are all provided by, or depend upon, certain facts 
about what would fulfill or achieve our present desires or aims.” (45) Since situating morality 
within a structure of facts lends a basic consistency, which desire lacks, objective foundations 
are able to provide normative reasons, where desire can only ever offer motivating reasons for 
action.  
 Although Parfit presents a minimal account of the role of motivating reasons within 
morality, desires are nonetheless incorporated into normativity in a crucial way. Often what we 
are motivated to do through desire is not normative; (37) however, it is also true that “we have 
many reasons for acting that we wouldn’t have if we didn’t have certain desires.”(67) This 
apparent discrepancy is reconciled through the claim that, desires, in some circumstances, are 
facts which may be used in a normative way. Parfit claims that “when the fulfillment of some 
desire would give us pleasure, this fact gives us a value-based hedonic reason to do what would 
fulfill this desire,” (68) but since he also says that subjective theories are “mistaken,” and there 
are no “desire-based, aim-based, or choice-based” reasons, he must provide an account of how 
desires are to be seen as distinctly separate from hedonic reasons. (65) 
As was seen in Chapter 1, Subjectivists claim to confer value onto a thing, or into an 
action primarily due to our present conscious desire, or wanting an object or action. Parfit 
contends that ascribing value to objects or actions in this way is to misunderstand the 
                                                            
8 It is important to note here that Parfit had claimed earlier that practical reasons are provided by “certain facts 
that give us reasons both to have certain desires and aims, and to do whatever might achieve these aims. These 
reasons are given by facts about the objects of these desires or aims, or what we might want or try to achieve. We 
can therefore call such reasons object-given,” (45). Therefore we should see Parfit as using “practical”, 
synonymously with object-given.  
30 
 
relationships of sensations, hedonic likings or dislikings, and our conscious mental states of 
these likings and dislikings. Following Parfit, I will refer to these three distinctions, respectively, 
as sensations, hedonic likings or dislikings, and meta-hedonic desires. In order to understand 
why Parfit claims that Subjectivism, which bases its value within the hedonic desires, fails to 
generate values, it will be necessary to understand exactly how these three respective concepts 
are distinctly unique, yet often work in unison.  
 Sensations, which are the most basic of the three, are simply those temporally present 
physical stimuli which agents experience through their empirical faculties. Sensations lack value  
in terms of good and bad, but rather are the purely descriptive realities of sensory perception. 
They are normatively neutral, and any singular sensation can be the object of a meta-hedonic 
desire. Sensations do not contain any intrinsic value, and although sensations might, for 
example, “be claimed to be in themselves bad when their quality is affected in certain ways by 
our disliking them,” (54) this does not give value to the sensation, but rather, value resides in 
our conscious state of disliking a sensation. As will be shown, all value which typically has been 
ascribed to sensations, whether positively or negatively, has been situated incorrectly within 
our relationship to stimuli. Instead of placing value upon our sensations, value correctly 
situated should be seen as attached to our different mental states.  
 Hedonic likings or dislikings, which are often confused with pure sensations, are instead, 
the agent’s specific liking or disliking of a given sensation as it is presented to him. Hedonic 
reasons are provided simply by the affinity towards or against sensations as they are perceived. 
For example, when an agent experiences the sensation of his hand being burned there is a 
sensation of burning flesh which is then received and often turned into a disliking for that 
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sensation. It is entirely possible, however, that an individual may enjoy the sensation of burned 
flesh, which is usually associated with pain, and in that case there would be a liking of this 
sensation.  
It is also true of hedonic likings and dislikings, like sensations, that they “cannot be 
aimed at the future, or at what is merely possible.” (54)  Since our hedonic likings or dislikings 
must be responses to sensations, in the absence of a present sensation, we cannot experience a 
hedonic desire. Therefore, although hedonic likings are conscious mental states, since they lack 
the ability to be future oriented, and desire simply is a wanting of a state that we are not in, 
hedonic likings, and dislikings are not desires. 
 The key distinction that Parfit makes in the structure of desire is what he calls meta-
hedonic desires. Parfit believes that these meta-hedonic desires are most often overlooked or 
undifferentiated. “Many people fail to distinguish between hedonic likings or dislikings and such 
meta-hedonic desires…[and] these mental states differ in several ways.” (54)  Unlike the 
hedonic likings or dislikings of some sensation, our meta-hedonic desires are our conscious 
awareness of these likings or dislikings. For example when I burn my hand on a flame, I have a 
sensation of being burnt, as well as either a hedonic liking or disliking of this sensation. It is also 
the case that I am aware of this hedonic orientation, and that I am conscious of either the fact 
that I like or dislike this sensation. It is within the understanding of meta-hedonic desires that 
we can begin to ascribe value to sensations. “Though these sensations are not in themselves 
good or bad, they are part of complex mental states that are good or bad. When we are in pain, 
what is bad is not our sensation but our conscious state of having a sensation that we dislike.” 
(54)  When ascribing value it is important to understand that the meta-hedonic desires “do not 
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make their objects good or bad,” (54) but rather since it is good to be in states which we like, 
positive meta hedonic desires count as a sort of fact which allows them to be used in a 
normative sense. 
          Meta-hedonic desires may, for example, provide a reason to remove a sensation which 
we dislike. As Parfit claims, “when we are in pain, what is bad is not our sensation but our 
conscious state of having a sensation that we dislike.” (54) Meta-hedonic desires differ from 
hedonic likings in that they are fulfilled by having sensations which we like, whereas hedonic 
likings cannot be fulfilled or unfulfilled. Our hedonic likings are simply our affinity towards or 
against a sensation as it is presented to us. Meta-hedonic desires, rather, are the conscious 
awareness of having a hedonic liking or disliking of a sensation and can be “fulfilled either by 
our ceasing to have this sensation, or by our continuing to have it but ceasing to dislike it.” (54) 
 Meta-hedonic likings and dislikings are the complex mental states which Parfit claims 
can be viewed as good or bad. Because it is good for us to not be in states of pain or to have 
mental or physical states that we dislike, Parfit claims that object-given theories can appeal to 
meta-hedonic desires in such a way that these desires provide normative reasons. According to 
Parfit, when we are experiencing a state which we dislike we have object-given reasons to avoid 
this state. The critical step which Parfit claims that Subjectivists get wrong though is that they 
confer value onto a state because of our desire. However, this misunderstands the relationship 
of desire and normativity. As Parfit claims, “though it is good to have sensations that we like, 
nothing is good merely because we want this thing.” (55) If sensations were ‘good’ in such a 
way, then hedonic desires would generate reasons, and we would not need to appeal to meta-
hedonic desires. Yet, Parfit insists that what makes meta-hedonic desires good or bad is that 
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they appeal to facts about our desires which give us reasons to pursue states that we like and 
avoid those we do not. These reasons are not dependent upon our liking of these states, but 
any agent who is substantively rational would also like any state that they have object-given 
reasons to do. 
Therefore the three concepts previously labeled work in tandem to create value in a 
very different way than Subjective desire. Subjectivists claim to have sensations which they like 
or dislike, and then attempt to ascribe value to a particular action which correlates with this 
liking or disliking. Yet, they omit the crucial step of appealing to meta-hedonic desires, and it is 
because of this omission that they fail to generate value. Since meta-hedonic desires are 
dependent upon reasons and not just upon our independent desires, they are able to provide 
value where hedonic likings or dislikings do not. This value stems from the fact that unlike 
sensations and hedonic likings we can change our meta-hedonic desires in two distinct ways. 
Since “what we want is not to be having a sensation that we dislike”, and, what we are disliking 
is our conscious awareness of having a sensation which we do not want, “Our desire [to not 
have a sensation which we dislike] could be fulfilled either by our ceasing to have this 
sensation, or by our continuing to have it but ceasing to dislike it.” (54)  Thus for the Objectivist 
our meta-hedonic desires may be informed by reasons and are open to change once we apply 
these reasons to our mental states. This allows for a dependence upon reasons in a way that 
the subjectivist, which cannot appeal to meta-hedonic states, is not allowed. 
Parfit believes that Subjectivists focus their moral claims within the context of hedonic 
likings and dislikings, and it is for this reason that they end up being groundless. Hedonic likings 
and dislikings cannot in themselves provide any more value than sensations, since they are 
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merely our affinities towards sensations as we experience them. Hedonic likings and dislikings 
are merely the fact that we like or dislike particular sensations, and therefore they are simply 
our present desires for certain stimuli. Meta-hedonic desires, however, go beyond just a liking 
or disliking: these meta-hedonic desires are conscious mental states that can respond to certain 
facts, such as the fact that it is a substantive good to be within a state of pleasure, or a 
substantive evil to be within a state of pain. Through a response to facts an agent who is 
experiencing sensations, such as a hedonic disliking, can change his relation to this sensation in 
such a way that it would cease to be something which they dislike. Although meta-hedonic 
desires are incapable of imbuing value into a sensation itself, an agent may respond to 
sensations by using these desires in such a way that they would provide reason for action. For 
example, 
When we are experiencing intense pleasure, by having some 
sensation that we intensely like, we have no reason to be liking 
this sensation. If we did not like this sensation, we would not be 
being irrational, or making any mistake. But we have strong 
reasons to want to be having, and to go on having, sensations that 
we intensely like. (56) 
 
Meta-hedonic desires are able to generate reasons since they depend upon the 
satisfaction of substantive principles. They do not make sensations good or bad, and as such 
this limits subjectivists from using them to claim that desires may provide value, but because 
these desires appeal to facts about our well-being, they are capable of providing reasons. 
 Parfit provides an account of reasons which is dependent upon facts, but, in a useful 
way, incorporates desires into normativity. Although desires, which are always subject-based, 
cannot provide normative reasons by themselves, desires can be used as normative facts when 
deciding what we have most reason to do. Therefore what we have most or decisive reason to 
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do can often be dependent upon certain desires which we have. No desire in itself can be 
substantive, but because we should all want to be being in states that we enjoy, and the 
fulfillment of desire is the way in which this is possible, it is often necessary to fulfill our meta-
hedonic desires. 
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CHAPTER 3: NOTIONS OF SUBJECTIVE DELIBERATION 
Section 1: The Individual Good, and Contract Theory 
 Without preamble or specific justification Parfit claims that John Rawls belongs within 
the category of Subjectivists.  There are two plausible explanations of this, one at the individual 
level, and one at the macro or societal level.  The former provides the framework for the latter 
and gives substance to Rawls’ Theory of Justice. Therefore it will be important to provide first 
the individual or micro account of Rawls’ subjectivism, and then further the macro or societal 
account. Once this has been done, we should have an accurate understanding of Parfit’s 
labeling Rawls’ as a subjectivist. 
The micro account of normativity which Rawls presents is one in which he defines 
reasons in terms of the good, and this is translated simply as “the successful execution of a 
rational plan of life.” (R380) For example, Rawls asks us to “imagine someone whose only 
pleasure is to count blades of grass in various geometrically shaped areas such as park squares 
and well-trimmed lawns…The definition of the good forces us to admit that the good for this 
man is indeed counting blades of grass.” (R379) Rawls claims that what is good for this man is 
counting blades of grass and although this man is an exception to Rawls’ conception of 
rationality, Rawls, nevertheless admits that the good for this man lies within his desire to count 
blades of grass. The view of the good which Rawls’ uses depends upon what he calls the 
Aristotelian Principle, which states that “other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of 
their realized capacities, and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the 
greater the complexity.” (R374)  
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Rawls combines the Aristotelian Principle with the conception of a rational plan, and 
together these generate judgments of value. Since, as Rawls claims, “the things that are 
commonly thought of as human goods should turn out to be the ends and activities that have a 
major place in rational plans,” (R378) when we enjoin the two claims that realized capacities 
bring us happiness, and the procedural means to do this is through a rational plan, it is possible 
to see that, for Rawls, on the micro level, procedural rules that result in happiness are 
equivalent to the good, and thus generate reasons. 
By translating procedural rationality into terms of a rational plan, we can see that, when 
combined with the Aristotelian Principle, on an individual level, Rawls provides a subjective 
account of normativity. By espousing a conception of the good which is predicated upon the 
fulfillment of our desires (realization of our capacities) along with adhering to a rational plan to 
realize these desires, Rawls’ can be seen as following a similar account of DT which Parfit 
presents. 
Aside from the individual subjectivist account which Rawls provides, we must also 
consider his macro account of political justice. An inclusion of Rawls’ contract theory is vital due 
to the simple fact that Rawls’ writings on justice and political theory provide a necessary 
deliberative foundation which is not found in his micro level conception of normativity. 
For Rawls, the principles of justice are decided upon by the contractors of the polity 
from behind the veil of ignorance, and are subjective principles of justice which are accepted 
due to the probability that the individual contractor would be placing herself in the best 
scenario comparatively to others which they may choose.  
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 Rawls claims that when pursuing principles of justice, when behind the veil, the aim is to 
“use the idea of pure procedural justice from the beginning” (R104) in determining what is 
right. By using principles that are procedurally just9 we would agree to a conception of justice 
that is “stable” since it is optimally just to all irrespective of the corresponding facts associated 
with the state in which they actually find themselves. A form of justice which follows this 
framework is stable since it produces an equilibrium which is “the best situation that [any] can 
reach by free exchange,” and since “no one has any incentive to alter it, it will persist in the 
absence of further changes in the circumstances.” (R103) 
Rawls’ insistence upon the use of pure procedural principles appears to be the basis for 
Parfit’s claim that Rawls is a subjectivist about reasons. The two principles, Equal Liberty,10 and 
the Difference Principle11 upon which Rawls founds his theory of justice are derived solely from 
rational deliberation. “What these individuals will do is then derived by strictly deductive 
reasoning from these assumptions about their beliefs and interests, their situation and the 
options open to them.  Their conduct is, in the phrase of Pareto, the resultant of tastes and 
obstacles.” (103) For Rawls, the principles of justice are drawn solely out of a procedurally 
rational approach to morality which are chosen due to their ability to promote the individuals 
                                                            
9 I.e. principles that do not favor individuals based upon preexisting economic, social, political, mental, etc. states. 
But, rather, temporarily blinds the individual to these facts that are “arbitrary from the moral point of view” (R104) 
which allows a form of justice that is agreed on based on the subjective desire of an individual to be as maximally 
happy as they may hope to be, and yet limits their knowledge of their current state so that they may not favor 
their own preferences over others. 
10 “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with 
a similar system of liberty for all,” (R220). 
11 “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of his equality of opportunity,” (R266). 
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own wellbeing above all else. “They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned 
to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality.” (10) 
 The principles of justice are seen as subjective in nature due to their application only in 
satisfying the individual’s own interests. An individual in the original position, who is behind the 
veil of ignorance, would rationally choose only those principles that favor themselves, and in so 
doing would opt for Rawls’ two principles. If Parfit is to claim that Rawls’ theory is subjective, it 
must be due to the appeal of the “tastes and obstacles” of the original position contractors. 
Parfit must contend that an adherence to one’s own interests is that which makes Rawls’ 
system subjective, or else it becomes very unclear as to how Rawls’ principles of justice would 
fit the title ‘subjective’, since Rawls is himself clearly concerned with substantive appeals.  
As Rawls writes, “I wish, then, to stress the central place of the study of our substantive 
moral conceptions.”12 (R45) The principles which Rawls presents are, in Rawls opinion, as close 
to substantive as imperfect actual agents may hope to arrive at, and as such should be 
“regarded as provisionally justified.” (R46) Yet, as has already been seen, Parfit rejects that 
Subjectivists can appeal to substantive claims, and so Parfit must reject Rawls use of these 
principles for one of two reasons: either they must be seen as non-substantive, or these 
principles are not logically open to Subjectivists since they “deny that we have such object-
given reasons.” (62)  
 Rawls claims that viewing his two principles as substantive is justified since they do “all 
that one may reasonably ask” from a theory of justice (R36). Whether these principles are truly 
                                                            
12 Although Rawls does not use ‘substantive’ in the way in which Parfit uses substantive when discussing 
rationality, I believe that there is a strong correlation between the two nevertheless. Since, when Parfit uses 
‘substantive’ he is referring to ‘what we choose’, and as will be seen shortly, through Rawls’ use of reflective 
equilibrium, Rawls’ theory of justice also focuses upon what we choose, I believe that in a broad sense Rawls and 
Parfit are addressing the same conception of ‘substantive’. 
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substantively the best principles may be debated, but it is of little doubt that these principles 
satisfy Parfit’s notion of substantive rationality, since they clearly are primarily aimed at what 
we choose. Although Rawls depends upon a procedurally rational operation in determining his 
two principles, this alone does not render him a Subjectivist, since even Parfit’s ideal Objectivist 
agent must be procedurally rational. Rawls’ two principles are substantive in nature, and as 
such, Parfit cannot conclude that Rawls is a Subjectivist from examining these principles alone. 
Instead, if Parfit is to label Rawls as a Subjectivist it must be due to Rawls’ method in 
determining his substantive principles. 
  Parfit’s contention of Rawls’ Subjectivism seems most plausibly directed at Rawls’ 
appeal to the “tastes and obstacles” of agents, as well as his assertion that his theory of justice 
is, from the beginning, a purely procedural one. Even though Rawls claims to arrive at 
substantive principles, since his foundations are purely procedural, they must be seen as 
subjectively derived, and thus, if Parfit is correct, ultimately inaccessible to Rawls. The principles 
of Justice satisfy Parfit’s account of substantively rational principles, but because they are 
derived solely out of a procedural framework, which must be subjective, since it aims at “how 
we make our choices,” these principles are not open to Deliberative Subjectivists, because they 
depend upon object-given reasons. Rawls’ ideal agent behind the veil of ignorance chooses 
these principles not because they are what is substantively rational, but rather because they 
are those that “after such [ideal] deliberation, we would choose.” (63) Thus it appears that to 
correctly understand Parfit’s assertion, that Rawls is a subjectivist, we must understand Rawls’ 
subjectivism as being founded in his procedural framework of justice. 
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 Another key component of Rawls’ theory of justice is the use of reflective equilibrium 
when determining principles. Reflective equilibrium compares the principles which we derive 
from behind the veil of ignorance with our pre-analytic moral intuitions, and determines their 
applicability as moral concepts based on this comparison. The use of reflective equilibrium is 
needed as an evaluative tool, because it just simply is the “fact that our present theories are 
primitive and have grave defects.” (R45)  
 Reflective Equilibrium provides a means of examining the principles which we arrive at 
through deliberative processes. Since Rawls relies upon a purely procedural and deliberative 
route in determining what we have reason to do, and as non-ideal agents we often err in our 
deliberations, reflective equilibrium provides a principle for reexamining and adjusting our 
deliberations to account for apparent shortcomings in the principles we derive from 
deliberation. Therefore we must use reflective equilibrium upon completion of our 
deliberations in order to ensure that there are not overt mismatches between our pre-analytic 
intuitions, and our judgments about what reasons we have which are formed through 
processes of deliberation. This process still maintains solely subjective appeals, since reflective 
equilibrium depends upon only our moral intuitions, and this, as Parfit claims, falls to provide 
substantive justification.   
 
 
Section 2: Internal Reasons and Deliberative Priority 
 
Bernard Williams provides a deliberative foundation of reasons which in many ways 
parallels that of the Deliberative Subjectivist viewpoint provided by Parfit. Williams places 
deliberation, or rather correct deliberation, above all other concerns within the framework of 
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normativity, and couples this with internal reasons, or desires, to generate reasons for action. 
Agents have many internal reasons, along with concerns of practical necessity which may 
influence their deliberations, and so we must have some way to assign what Williams calls, 
deliberative priority.13 What follows then is a presentation of Williams’ model of normativity, 
which blends internal reasons or desires, along with deliberation in order to generate reasons. 
 Williams’ account of reasons is an internalist one which he presents in his paper, 
“Internal and External Reasons.”14 The internalist structure that Williams provides is presented 
in a four point argument which he gives in contrast to the externalist theory of desire. Williams’ 
argument which hinges on the use of an agent’s subjective motivational set (S), and all potential 
desires, which are members of S (D), claims that 
(i) an internal reason statement is falsified by the absence of some 
appropriate element from S. 
 
(ii) A member of S, D, will not give A a reason for ɸ-ing if either 
the existence of D is dependent on false belief, or A’s belief in the 
relevance of ɸ-ing to the satisfaction of D is false. 
 
(iii) (a) A may falsely believe an internal reason statement about 
himself, and (we can add) 
   
       (b) A may not know some true internal reason statement 
about himself. 
 
(iv) internal reason statements can be discovered in deliberative 
reasoning.15 
 
These premises given by Williams are meant to provide an alternative viewpoint to the 
simplified internalist account which is often ascribed to Hume, namely that “any element in S 
                                                            
13 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy,185. 
14 Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” 101-113. 
15 Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” 102-104. 
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gives rise to internal reasons.”16 (i) implies, however, that an agent, A, ceases to have an 
internal reason if elements in S are based upon false beliefs. For example, if A has a glass of 
liquid which he believes to be gin and desires to drink it, but in fact the liquid is actually petrol, 
according to the Humean model, S still has a reason to drink the liquid due to his desire D.  (i) 
contends that S in fact does not have a reason, and Williams claims that this is a justifiable 
conclusion since it is false that we should only be concerned with explanation of A’s, D. Rather 
when determining what we have reason to do we must take into account whether A’s 
deliberation and actions were rational.  
(i) claims that the absence of some element in S falsifies reasons which result when 
these elements are absent. Yet because (i) doesn’t mention what these elements are, it must 
be subsumed under (ii) in order to be of use. Therefore we must turn to (ii) to provide the 
elements which have the ability to falsify internally generated reasons 
(ii) establishes that all D’s that are dependent upon false beliefs, or which provide a 
procedural reasons to ɸ that are not supported by true beliefs, are elements which render 
internally generated reasons false. In other words, without true beliefs, which should properly 
be understood as the missing elements in (i), A does not have a substantive reason to ɸ. The 
externalist at this point typically admits that since A does not have a substantive reason to ɸ, 
then they in fact have no reason whatsoever to ɸ. This however, according to Williams is false. 
Although A does not have a substantive reason to ɸ in the gin example, A would 
nevertheless have a procedural reason to ɸ, which equates to saying that A acted rationally, 
even though A  ɸ-ed based on a false or ignorant belief. It is false to claim that A had no reason 
                                                            
16 Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,”102. 
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for ɸ-ing when acting upon D which is supplied or influenced by a false belief. A in fact had 
reason to ɸ, but as will be seen this reason is outweighed and assessed less priority than A’s D 
which is based upon true beliefs and correct deliberation. 
Because A may have reasons which are not substantive, by separating what is rational 
into procedural and substantive appeals Williams is able to engage the use of (iii) and (iv). (iii) 
separates the types of falsifications that can be impressed upon D into those which (a) result 
from a false belief, and (b) those which result from ignorance. (a) and (b) are, according to 
Williams, the two ways in which a false belief may be acquired and used in a procedurally 
rational way by A, and although they are both subsumed under (iv) and thus rendered 
insufficient in providing substantive reasons, they nevertheless, much like Parfit’s account, may 
still result in rational action.  
  (iii) precludes appeals to substantive reasons and so Williams must invoke (iv), which 
claims that, internal reason statements can be discovered in deliberative reasoning. All 
members of S that are in the form of D are capable of generating rationally provided reasons 
for ɸ-ing, but, according to Williams, this does not necessarily supply a substantive reason to ɸ. 
As Williams says,  
A has reason to ɸ’ does not mean ‘the action which A has overall, 
all-in, reason to do is ɸ-ing. He can have reason to do a lot of 
things which he has other and stronger reasons not to do.17 
 
A may have reasons to ɸ, but the reasons provided by D may be overridden by other 
stronger internal reason which arise out of the process of deliberation. Because D may be 
                                                            
17 Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,”104. 
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overridden by internal reasons which are found through deliberation, (iv) is the proper place in 
which we encounter Williams’ concept of deliberative priority. 
Deliberative priority is that principle which provides us with substantive reasons, and is 
situated solely within the act of deliberation. Yet unlike externalist accounts, such as Parfit’s, 
the deliberative process is one that necessarily must not only contain normativity, but also, by 
definition, motivate. As Korsgaard writes, in Williams’ model “anything reached by a process of 
deliberation from the subjective motivational set [S] may be something for which there is an 
internal reason, one that can motivate.”18 Thus, according to Williams, we should realize that 
“on any adequate showing, ethical motivations are going to be important, and this has 
consequences for how we should deliberate.”19 Since William’s account of reasons is one which 
links rational deliberation inextricably with internal desires, it is necessary to understand what 
part each of these elements play within normativity, and how priority may be established. 
Motivational concerns notwithstanding, Williams’ model of deliberation is one which in 
many ways parallels that of Parfit’s, and as such I will use Parfit’s account of reasons as a 
template to explain Williams’ notion of deliberative priority. As was seen in Parfit’s account 
reasons can be separated into apparent and real reasons, and although all real reasons are also 
apparent, apparent reasons are not necessarily real. All real reasons are decisive and based 
upon facts, such that any ideal agent, whom would necessarily deliberate correctly, would 
choose those real reasons which are open to them.  
                                                            
18 Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends,326. Henceforth, in this thesis numbers in parenthesis with 
the prefix K refer to this book.  
19 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 185. 
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Parfit’s model of reasons is an external object-given one.  All appeals to what an agent 
has reason to do are provided by facts, and thus there is no possibility of a petition to members 
of S within this view. A critical move that Parfit makes, however, is to allow A the ability to 
rationally choose a non-real, apparent reason, even though it lacks substantive justification. 
This allows Parfit to maintain external reasons, and yet not undermine what seems like a 
plausible account of rationality.  
When Parfit’s model of rationality is imposed upon Williams’ we see that, although 
Williams depends upon internal reasons and not object-given facts, Williams has a similar 
conception of rational deliberation. Williams, unlike Parfit, is unwilling to abandon motivational 
concerns within normativity, and so internal reasons are necessary, but, by using deliberation, 
Williams nevertheless claims that we can assign priority to reasons in a similar fashion. All 
members of S, D, have the ability to generate the equivalent of what Parfit calls apparent 
reasons, and although possibly rational, the reasons generated through D may not be 
substantive. What we may have “overall” reason, or for Parfit, decisive reason to do, may be 
different than what D would imply. Therefore, we must assign priority to some concerns such 
as our ethical motivations, obligations (such as those of immediacy, or emergency), issues of 
practical necessity, and others.20 
Deliberative priority functions similarly to the deliberative process which Parfit uses in 
determining what we have decisive reason to do. The key difference is that Parfit believes that 
because we can appeal to object-given facts, we have objectively substantive reasons which are 
generated. Whereas for Williams there are no objectively substantive reasons, instead, Williams 
                                                            
20 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 185-190. 
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believes that “there is an essential indeterminacy in what can be counted a rational deliberative 
process,”21 yet this merely shows that “there is a wider range of states, and a less determinate 
one, than one might have supposed, which can be counted as A’s having a reason to ɸ.”22  
The model of deliberation which Williams provides is capable of presenting a union of 
normativity with motivational reasons which many objective theories lack; however, it is also 
susceptible to certain critiques, like that of Parfit’s, since it relies fundamentally upon desires. 
Since all reasons must motivate, and this in turn implies that, for Williams, all reasons are 
internal, according to Parfit, there is a basic lack of substantive force behind Williams’ model. 
The way in which Williams attempts to avoid apparent substantive shortcomings in his 
model of deliberation is by adhering to certain fundamental desires which rational agents must 
possess and use when deliberating. Williams’ does not systematically attempt to present all 
internal reasons which rational agents must inherently desire, but he does provide several 
rational desires which agents must possess if deliberation is to be useful in generating internal 
reasons. As Williams says,  
Included in the S  of every rational agent is a desire not to fail 
through error … it may be claimed that prudential, or again moral, 
policies are similarly involved in what it is to be a fully rational 
agent … It may, indeed, to some extant be true, particularly with 
regard to a modest amount of prudence; if an agent is totally 
devoid of concern for the effects of his actions on himself, we may 
indeed have problems in understanding what could count for him 
as a sound deliberative route at all. But to the extent that these 
things are true, then we are being told something about the 
necessary contents of the S of any rational agent.23 
 
                                                            
21 Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” 110. 
22 Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” 110. 
23 Williams, Philosophy as Humanistic Discipline, 111.  
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 Desires, such as prudence, are not just necessary deliberative tools, Williams claims that 
they are necessary members of S for all rational agents. By including necessary members of S, 
of which I will argue later there are others, Williams is able to appeal to substantive claims 
about deliberation. If Williams is correct, and there are members of S which all rational agents 
have, then these desires contain sufficient substantive force to generate normative reasons. 
Although Parfit will raise concerns about the normativity of these desires, I will defend their 
ability to provide sufficient foundations for substantive subjectivist appeals. 
 
 
Section 3: The Categorical Unity of Desires 
 
Although Michael Smith agrees with Williams’ account of reasons in many ways, he 
rejects the notion that normativity follows a strictly internal account of reasons. The Internalist 
standard of reasons which Williams provides is partly true, according to Smith, but it also lacks 
critical components which, in turn, render it an incomplete, or inadequate version of 
Normativity.  
Williams’ account of reasons which Smith responds to is presented as,  
Someone has a reason to ɸ in circumstances C if and only if she 
would desire that she ɸs in circumstances C if she were fully 
rational, where in order to be fully rational an agent must satisfy 
the following three conditions: (i) the agent must have no false 
beliefs. (ii) the agent must have all relevant true beliefs. (iii) the 
agent must deliberate correctly.24 
 
Smith claims that, “Williams’ conditions (i) through (iii) seem to [Smith] to constitute a 
fairly accurate spelling out of our idea of practical rationality.” (S158) Yet Smith argues that 
                                                            
24 Michael Smith. The Moral Problem, 156. Henceforth, in this thesis numbers in parenthesis with the prefix S refer 
to this book.  
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there is something lacking in Williams’ account of (iii), and without “supplementation” Williams’ 
readers are left with an inadequate account of correct deliberation. Without further 
constraints, (i) through (iii) cannot preclude the critical objections of “compulsions, addictions, 
emotional disturbances, and the like.”(S158) Moreover, Williams depends primarily upon the 
use of the imagination in creating new, or destroying old desires, and although “Williams is 
right, [Smith thinks] that deliberation can both produce new and destroy old underived desires. 
[Williams] is wrong that the only, or even the most important, way in which this happens is via 
the exercise of the imagination.” (S158) 
Furthermore, Smith claims that if Williams is correct when stating that “reason sanctions 
the operation of the imagination,” it is only due to the significant qualification that “desires are 
systematically justifiable.”  (S159) To elaborate upon this point, and to provide his qualification, 
Smith appeals to Rawls’ conception of reflective equilibrium to show precisely how reason can 
sanction the use of imagination.  
When we are deliberating about what we have reason to do, and also about what 
desires we ought to have, we deliberate by “trying to find out whether our desires are 
systematically justifiable.” (S159) Those desires which are “non-derivatively desirable” are 
systematically justifiable, since they are a basis for all derivative desires which we may have. 
When we are deciding upon which desires which it may be rational to have, we must use a 
reflective method which establishes a unity of those desires which as a set may be called 
normative.  
The desires which may be united as a particular virtue should be those non-derivative 
desires which underlie all resulting desires that may come about as procedural necessities. The 
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process which is undergone in an attempt to discern the virtues is one of reflective equilibrium, 
since this principle attempts to uncover the basic desires which non-derivatively ground the 
virtues. Those desires which are to be labeled as virtues must be applicable across many 
situations and among all or most subjects, and as such, they must not only be non-derivative, 
but also widely applicable. It is for this reason that Smith uses Rawls’ principle of reflective 
equilibrium, since this principle makes reductions until it arrives at non-derivative desires, 
which “match our considered convictions.” (R18) Therefore as Rawls claims, “It is an 
equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is reflective since we 
know to what principles our judgments conform and the premises of their derivation.” (R18) 
Smith incorporates imagination, as Williams sees it functioning, into the conception of 
reflective equilibrium by claiming that we can imagine those desires which non-derivatively 
ground virtuous desire. Thus by using the reflective component in our deliberative process, we 
can imagine those desires which match our considered convictions, or basic moral intuitions, 
and thus arrive at virtuous desires in this manner. However, although we can use imagination in 
this way, Smith maintains that imagination is merely one of the ways in which we can reach 
these virtues through the process of reflection, and thus we must instead broaden the criteria 
for satisfying (iii). Even though Williams is correct that imagination can be used in a critical way 
to satisfy (iii), there are also other satisfactory routes when deliberating correctly, and so 
Williams account although correct, needs supplementation.  
When we understand (iii) as incorporating a systematically justifiable principle, such as 
that of reflective equilibrium, we can begin to formulate precisely how desires may be united 
into cohesive groups to form virtues. As Rawls claims, we present a certain set of shared 
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conditions, and “then see if these conditions are strong enough to yield a significant set of 
principles. If not, we look for further premises equally reasonable. (R18) And further, as Parfit 
claims, when we are deciding upon what is virtuous, “we could justifiably reject any 
Contractualist formula if this formula’s implications conflict too often and too strongly with our 
intuitive moral beliefs.” (370) Therefore, by using a Contractualist principle, such as Rawls 
presents, we could arrive at those desires which satisfy our intuitive moral beliefs, and also are 
those which any rational agent could will.   
With an understanding of how Smith uses reflective equilibrium as a tool for correct 
deliberation, we arrive at Smith’s more important claim that we can “think of the moral 
requirements that apply to agents as themselves categorical requirements of rationality or 
reason.”(S85) Obviously this is contrary to Parfit’s claims (as will be shown in Chapter 4), since, 
according to Parfit, only substantive appeals may generate categorical requirements.  However, 
it will be necessary to glean from Smith’s argument how he may claim categorical appeals 
within desires, as this will be a major contention for Parfit. 
Smith claims that the argument against the rationalists’ claim, such as that put forward 
by Philippa Foot, that “it is a conceptual truth that requirements of rationality or reason are 
hypothetical imperatives… is false.” (S84) Instead, according to Smith, it seems much more 
plausible that “it is in fact a conceptual truth that requirements of rationality or reason are 
categorical imperatives, not hypothetical imperatives.” (S84) Foot argues that practical 
rationality is a system of hypothetical imperatives, and thus if morality is fully dependent upon 
rationality, morality as well must consist of hypothetical imperatives. As Foot writes, 
It is uncertain whether the doctrine of the categorical imperative 
even makes sense. The conclusion we should draw is that moral 
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judgments have no better claim to be categorical imperatives 
than do statements about matters of etiquette.25 
 
In response to challenges, such as that by Foot, Smith presents his positive account of 
categorical reasons, which come about through a rational and deliberative process. The 
foundation for this process lies within a conjunction of both Williams’ three conditions, as well 
as a dependence upon Rawls’ account of reflective equilibrium. For Smith, we have reason to 
act in some way when all three of Williams’ conditions are met, and we properly understand 
(iii) as implying a more robust notion of deliberation which is supported by those desires which 
are systematically justifiable. The moral requirements which rational agents have are only 
required of them because they are categorical requirements for all rational agents. Through the 
use of Williams’ three conditions, an agent who has all relevant beliefs, no false beliefs, and 
deliberates correctly would be able to correctly judge what he has reason to do. Therefore, 
since “our judgments about what we are morally required to do are simply judgments about 
what the categorical requirements of rationality or reason demand of us,” (S91) when we judge 
correctly, we also follow the categorical imperatives which correspond to correct deliberation.  
One of the procedural rules which Smith claims that we are required to integrate into 
our desires is “a more coherent and unified desiderative profile and evaluative outlook.” (S159) 
According to Smith, the unity of our desires under a coherent desiderative profile allows for the 
explanation of irrational desires and preferences. This unity is achieved through systematic 
justification, and motivates the conclusion that all desires which fall outside of this justification 
are irrational, and therefore do not generate reasons. 
                                                            
25 Philippa Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” 312.  
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 Therefore, all desires which are systematically justifiable, according to Smith, fit within 
the structure of correct deliberation, and thus should be seen as imperatives which are 
categorical. According to Smith, there are categorical demands placed upon us as rational 
agents. This is not substantially dissimilar to Williams, but by depending upon categorical 
demands of reason in this way Smith appears to provide substantive justification to subjective 
appeals which Williams seems less able to provide.  
 
Section 4: Internalism and Practical Reason 
 In her essay, “Skepticism about practical reason,” Christine Korsgaard claims that “it 
seems to be a requirement on practical reasons, that they be capable of motivating us.” (K317) 
Following what Korsgaard calls, “the Kantian approach to moral philosophy”, she claims that 
the focus of ethics, which is based upon practical reason, should be “explained in terms of 
rational standards that apply directly to conduct or to deliberation.” (K311)   
Korsgaard is primarily concerned with defending the use of practical reason within 
ethics, but through her defense she also concludes that practical reasons must also satisfy what 
she calls the internalism requirement. (K317) Korsgaard establishes this requirement by arguing 
“that unless reasons are motives, they cannot prompt or explain actions. And, unless reasons 
are motives, we cannot be said to be practically rational.” (K317) The internalism requirement 
which Korsgaard presents draws explicitly upon Williams’ account of deliberation and provides 
a route to reasons which are acquired through deliberation. These reasons, which although not 
ends or desires, but instead principles of pure practical reason, nevertheless, should be 
considered members of S. 
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Williams, as has been shown, argues that only members of S have the ability to motivate 
us which poses an apparent problem if we are to arrive at reasons through practical reason. 
Since practical reasons are usually phrased in terms of principles, and principles typically are 
thought of as external to the agent, Williams is skeptical about the ability of practical reason to 
motivate. Yet, Korsgaard claims that “pure practical reason will exist if and only if we are 
capable of being motivated by the conclusions of the operations of pure practical reason as 
such.” (K328) If Korsgaard is correct, and there is something in us capable of being motivated by 
the conclusions of practical reason, then that part of practical reason must already be a 
member of S.  As Korsgaard states, 
What seems to follow from the internalism requirement is this: if 
we can be motivated by considerations stemming from pure 
practical reason, then that capacity belongs to the subjective 
motivational set of every rational being. (K328) 
 
The conclusion which Korsgaard draws should be seen as consistent with Williams’ own, 
namely, that there are “necessary contents of the S of any rational agent.”26 Korsgaard believes 
that applying pure practical reason in this way is analogous to William’s insistence upon policies 
such as prudence. Appeals to pure practical reason are considered as necessary for rational 
deliberation, since they have a correlate within S which is capable of generating an internal 
reason for following such a principle. Korsgaard provides not only, as she sees it, a necessary 
connection between rational deliberation and practical reason, but makes the stronger claim 
that the combination of practical reason (through deliberation) and our desires, generate 
notions of the good, which then supplies us with reasons. As Korsgaard claims, “most things 
that are good, are good because of the interest human beings have in them…most of our ends 
                                                            
26 Williams, Philosophy as Humanistic Discipline, 111.  
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are conditioned goods because their value depends on the conditions of human existence, and 
the needs and desires to which those conditions give rise.” (K225) Those goods which are 
generated through practical reason are motivational in the sense that they satisfy the 
Internalist demand, but they are members of S on a categorical and fundamental level. 
 Therefore, it is not the case, as Williams thought, that principles are not able to have as 
a feature a corresponding relation to S which allows them to create internal reasons. The 
internalism requirement is supposed to limit those principles or policies which are capable of 
being members of S, but Korsgaard claims that the requirement has the opposite effect.  As 
Korsgaard claims, Williams does not give an account of how possible accounts of unconditional 
principles would motivate us, since “he only thinks there are none.”(K329) Williams instead 
“believes that the principles are acquired by education, training, and so forth, and that they do 
not admit of any ultimate justification.” (K328) If we accept Korsgaard’s conclusion, as I will 
argue later that we should, at least in some respects, the internalism requirement can be seen 
as being satisfied by pure practical reason.  When we satisfy the internalism requirement in this 
way, we must however place limitations upon pure practical reason, or, as Korsgaard claims, we 
face a reduction ad absurdum, since we allow the possibility that under this account “there is 
probably no moral theory that it excludes.” (K329)  
 If the internalism requirement could be satisfied in such a broad manner, and lacked the 
ability to exclude any moral theory whatsoever, it would be a useless demand placed upon 
ethics. Instead, as Korsgaard claims, it is a requirement placed upon psychological positions of 
agents, and “what it does is not to refute ethical theories, but to make a psychological demand 
on them.” (K329) By claiming that the internalism requirement is a psychological, and not an 
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ethical requirement, Korsgaard is able to maintain principles of pure practical reason, and still 
limit the breadth and scope of the principles which are applicable within ethical theories.  
 Williams’ account of reasons is insufficient for Korsgaard since Williams does not think 
that principles derived through pure practical reason can provide internal reasons that can 
motivate. Instead, since pure practical reason can provide universal, substantive claims, pure 
practical reason, according to Korsgaard, is necessary when constructing ethical theories. Yet, 
we cannot ground ethical theories without also satisfying the internalism requirement, but 
since this is done by appealing to a psychological requirement, Korsgaard seems able to justify 
both the use of pure practical reason in a way that Williams cannot, and also meet the 
internalism requirement, which she admits is a necessary component of reasons. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF SUBJECTIVE THEORIES 
In Chapter 1 I presented the conditions under which subjectivists claim to generate 
reasons. According to subjectivist theories, reasons are generated when we have ideal 
deliberation (fully informed and procedurally rational) that are founded upon desires, aims, or 
choice-based goals. Parfit contends that even when these ideal conditions are met, subjectivists 
are unable to adhere to substantive claims, and as such subjectivist theories fail to provide 
normativity. However, aside from these basic claims of the limits of subjective normativity, 
Parfit contends that when we carry subjective theories to their logical conclusions, they often 
have implausible implications which subjectivists themselves cannot rationally maintain. In this 
Chapter I will focus on these conclusions which are drawn out through what Parfit calls, the 
Agony, All or None, and Incoherence arguments.  
 Each of the three respective arguments are aimed at providing a sufficient foundation 
for concluding that subjectivism is false. By either showing that subjectivists depend upon 
implausible implications, or that subjectivists depend upon substantive, object-given facts to 
provide reasons, Parfit attempts to show that subjectivism fails as a theory to provide reasons.  
 
Section 1: The Agony Argument 
The Agony Argument attempts to prove that subjectivists cannot adhere to simple pre-
analytical claims, such as; ‘all humans ought to avoid, and try to avoid all future agony.’ As 
Parfit claims, “If we can have some reasons, nothing is clearer than the truth that, in the 
reason-implying sense, it is bad to be in agony.” (82) This truth is readily accepted by 
subjectivists and objectivists alike, but Parfit argues that, not only are subjectivists denied the 
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conclusion that agony should always be avoided when possible, but viewing agony in this way 
renders the subjectivist viewpoint self-defeating. 
 The Agony Argument claims that, 
We all have reason to want to avoid, and to try to avoid all future agony. 
  Subjectivism implies that we have no such reason. 
 Therefore 
  Subjectivism is false. (76) 
 Parfit believes that the first premise of The Agony Argument is a basic intuition that 
should plausibly hold for all moral theories. However, Parfit also claims that the fact that we 
have reason to want to avoid all future agony is a substantively based appeal, and is therefore 
only open to some form of value-based objective theory. Object-based theories are the only 
ones which may claim that “facts about our future desires give us reason.”(74) Therefore it 
must be shown how the first premise of The Agony Argument27 is limited only to object-based 
theories, and why subjectivism implies that we can have no such reasons.  
 To illustrate why he believes subjectivism cannot account for future desires, Parfit asks 
us to consider a case in which an agent knows that some future event will cause them a period 
of agony. Even after ideal deliberation they still have no present desire to avoid this future 
agony, which prompts Parfit to conclude that, “since I have no such desire or aim, all subjective 
theories imply that I have no reason to want to avoid this agony, and no reason to try to avoid 
it, if I can.” (74) Because, as Parfit claims, “Subjectivists claim that our reasons depend on what, 
                                                            
27  Henceforth in this thesis labeled as (A). 
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after ideal deliberation, we would choose,” (74)28 and not upon what reasons we would have 
after ideal deliberation, subjectivist theories cannot imply that the agent above has a reason to 
try and avoid this period of future agony. Even though the agent knows that he will later have a 
strong present desire to not be in his agonizing state, he nevertheless has no current desire 
which is motivating him to avoid this future agony, and thus subjectivists cannot claim a 
normative reason to avoid said future agony. 
 The critique which Parfit levels against subjectivists through (A) hinges upon the idea 
that subjectivists can only assert the formation of reasons through present desires, and “it is 
only certain facts about our own present desires, aims, or choices that give us reasons, or on 
which our reasons depend.” (75) However, these critiques focus solely upon our present desires 
and thus are properly limited to the Desire-Based, Telic Desire, Error-Free, and Informed Desire 
Theories, of which Parfit dismisses as weak formulations of subjectivism. Instead, for (A) to hold 
as correctly proving, as it purports to do, that subjectivism is false, it must engage The 
Deliberative Theory, which Parfit himself presents as the most plausible, or adequate version of 
subjectivism.  
 Parfit contends, as was shown in Chapter 1, that Deliberative Subjectivists are limited to 
procedural rationality, and for this reason cannot espouse substantive appeals about what we 
have reasons to do. I will attempt to show that this is in fact false in the following chapter, but 
for now, this distinction is important in understanding Parfit’s response to the deliberative 
Subjectivists in the application of (A). As Parfit claims, Deliberative Subjectivists might respond 
to (A) by claiming 
                                                            
28 Italics mine. 
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(A) We all have reasons to have those desires that would be had 
by anyone who was fully rational. 
 
(B) Anyone who was fully rational would want to avoid all future 
agony 
 
Therefore 
We all have a reason to want to avoid all future agony. (78) 
This argument, according to Parfit, is “ambiguous” due to the fact that Objectivists can 
accept (B), and that in order for (A) to hold true, we must appeal to substantive rationality, 
which is closed to subjectivists. There is a substantive object-given reason to want to avoid all 
future agony which is provided by the meta-hedonic desire to not be in conscious states that 
we dislike. This meta-hedonic desire is only open to objectivists though, since it depends upon 
object-given facts about what we have reason to want. As Parfit claims, “we have strong 
reasons to want to be having, and to go on having, sensations that we intensely like. We have 
even stronger reasons to want not to be in agony, by having sensations that, for no reason, we 
intensely dislike.” (56) These reasons provide object-given normative obligations to attempt to 
avoid future situations that we intensely dislike, such as those that involve agony; whereas, 
since subjectivists, according to Parfit, can only ever maintain procedural rationality, they are 
denied these object-given reasons about future events. Thus Deliberative Subjectivists can 
appeal to procedural rationality, but, since they cannot appeal to substantive object-given 
reasons, they cannot claim that the avoidance of agony is a future desire that humans must 
adhere to. Therefore, Parfit believes we can return to the original formulation of The Agony 
Argument and claim that Subjectivism is false.  
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 The Agony Argument is meant to show that subjectivism is false, and Parfit claims that 
the argument sufficiently establishes this falsity. There is, however, one last option which Parfit 
claims is open to subjectivists, and that is to claim, 
(E) the nature of agony gives us no reason to want to avoid being 
in agony. (81) 
 
Yet, in adhering to (E), subjectivists are dismissing the apparent pre-analytic intuition that 
agony is always something which we should avoid. Although claiming (E) does not lead 
subjectivists into a logical problem, such as their claim that we can have subjective reasons 
which by themselves generate a reason to avoid agony; we, nevertheless, ought to reject (E) 
since it is a “very implausible belief.” (82) Therefore, Parfit concludes that since subjectivism 
cannot account for the commonsensical pre-analytic intuition to always try and avoid agony, 
whenever possible, and objective theories, such as his own, can provide reasons to try and 
avoid agony, we ought to reject subjective theories in favor of some object-based theory. 
 What is important to note, however, is that Parfit does not exclude the fact that there 
are some telic desires which we are rationally required to have.29 Instead, Parfit only claims that 
the desire to avoid agony is not one of these desires. As Parfit says, “On subjective theories, we 
have no such object-given reasons, not even reasons to want to avoid future agony… except 
perhaps for the few desires without which we could not even be agents, there are no telic 
desires or aims that we are rationally required to have.” (78) The acceptance of possible desires 
which are rationally required to claim agent status seriously undermines Parfit’s contention 
                                                            
29 Here, Parfit is referring to Williams’ claim that “we must have ‘a desire not to fail through error’, and some 
‘modest amount of prudence,’” (Parfit, 78) and (Williams, 111). 
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that Subjectivists cannot appeal to substantive reasons. It is not important at this point which 
desires Parfit accepts as rationally required--only that there are some. 
 The fact that there are some telic desires which we must possess to be considered 
rational agents presents an apparent problem for Parfit, and one which he addresses through 
the work of Michael Smith. As was seen earlier, Smith claims that moral requirements are 
categorical requirements of rationality which are based in deliberation, and also systematically 
justifiable. Smith believes that by defining morality in this way we can account for and explain 
the irrationality of many desires and preferences. Furthermore, Smith, like Williams, believes 
that we must have certain procedural desires, and are required to not have “desires or 
preferences that draw some arbitrary distinction.” (79) This route, however, conversely to that 
of Williams insistence upon prudence and a desire not to fail through error, is not open to 
Subjectivists because we can only define ‘arbitrary’ in terms of certain facts that give us reasons 
to have certain preferences. For example, Parfit presents us with what he calls the Future 
Tuesday Indifference scenario, in which,  
[some] man cares about his own future pleasures or pains, except 
when they will come on any future Tuesday. This strange attitude 
does not depend on ignorance or false beliefs. Pain on Tuesdays, 
this man knows, would be just as painful, and just as much his 
pain, and Tuesdays are just like other days of the week. Even so, 
given the choice, this man would now prefer agony on any future 
Tuesday to slight pain on any other future day. (56) 
 
Smith would claim that this man’s preferences are irrational since they draw an arbitrary 
distinction which would not satisfy either ideal deliberation, or be systematically justifiable. Yet, 
this potential response by Smith is unsatisfactory, since, according to Parfit, in order to explain 
why this preference is arbitrary, we must claim 
63 
 
(1) if some ordeal would be on a future Tuesday, this fact does not 
give us any reason to care about it less.  
 
And 
(2) if some ordeal would be less painful, this fact does give us a 
reason to care about it less. (79) 
 
(1) and (2) however, “are claims about object-given reasons,” (79) and since object-given 
reasons are denied by subjectivists, Parfit claims that claims such as (1) and (2), Smith’s minimal 
principle of rationality, or Williams’ appeals to prudence, are not open to them.  
Since (E) provides us with an impractical account of normativity, to maintain a plausible 
account of morality we must return to the previous claim that, ‘we all have a reason to want to 
avoid, and try to avoid, all future agony.’  Yet by returning to this claim, which necessitates the 
use of object-given reasons, according to Parfit, we must conclude that Subjectivism is false.  
 
Section 2: The All or None Argument 
The Agony Argument attempts to show that Subjective theories result in implausible or 
unacceptable implications. However, the Agony Argument can only provide an account of the 
impracticality of Subjectivism, to provide a more robust substantive attack against Subjectivism 
another argument is needed; that argument is provided in the form of the All or None 
Argument.30  
Through ANA Parfit claims that either all desires generate reasons, much like the 
Humean model that Williams argues against, or, that no desires have this capability. It would be 
decidedly counter intuitive for any Subjectivists to claim adherence to either of these, for 
                                                            
30 Henceforth in this thesis referred to as (ANA). 
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various reasons presented previously, and so Parfit believes that if these are the only two 
options then we can label Subjectivism as false.  
As shown through both DT and William’s model of reasons, the most plausible account 
of Subjectivism is provided through an appeal to deliberative routes, which claim that agents 
have reason to act upon their fully informed and rational desires. Yet, more than just insisting 
upon the need for ideal deliberation, it appears as though we must also accept Smith’s claim 
that there are certain desires which must be in place if we are to be considered rational agents.  
Even though subjectivists would accept a combination of DT and Smith’s claims, we 
cannot, however, as Parfit claims, include agony into the set of telic desires which Smith argues 
for, nor can we claim that agony is precluded by ideal deliberation. Although it is hard to 
imagine that anyone could want to have a future period of agony, Parfit argues that, it is at 
least “conceivable, that someone might want future agony for its own sake.” (84) Therefore, 
according to Parfit, subjectivists must claim that when we desire agony for its own sake we 
have a reason to try and make this agony come about.  
If we return to the agent who wants to be in agony for its own sake, and assume that 
the agent is rational and goes through a process of ideal deliberation, we see that subjectivists 
are left with two responses to the agent’s desire: Subjectivists must either claim that he has a 
reason to want to be in agony, or that this desire does not give him a reason to want to be in 
agony. Since subjectivists must elude the impractical implications which follow if they adhere to 
the claim that they have a reason to be in agony, they must argue for the ability to deliberate in 
such a way that through deliberation some desires are found to be unable to provide reasons. 
However, as Parfit claims, subjectivists cannot distinguish between desires or aims that give us 
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reasons, and those that don’t. (89) Parfit claims that this is not possible, since in the act of 
choosing between desires we are placing value on certain desires over others in a way that has 
no meaning without value-based object-given reasons.  
 Because subjectivists cannot appeal to a valuation of certain desires in order to claim 
that they are impotent in terms of creating reasons, when we are considering cases where all of 
the relevant facts are known, we can argue 
If we have desire-based reasons for acting, all that would matter 
is whether some act would fulfill the telic desires that we now 
have after ideal deliberation. It would be irrelevant what we 
want, or would be trying to achieve. 
 
Therefore 
 
Either all such desires give us reasons, or none of them do. 
 
If all such desires gave us reasons, our desires could give us 
decisive reasons to cause ourselves to be in agony for its own 
sake, to waste our lives, and to try to achieve countless other bad 
or worthless aims. 
 
We could not have such reasons 
 
Therefore 
 
None of these desires gives us any reason. We have no such 
desire-based and choice-based reasons. (90) 
 
This argument (ANA) attempts to illustrate that given the claim that telic desires are 
capable of producing normative reasons, subjectivists are left with two options, neither of 
which is acceptable: either they can claim that all desires provide reasons, in which case the 
Humean problem has not been resolved, or, they can claim that some desires are incapable of 
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generating reasons. But in making this distinction they are conferring value upon some desires 
in such a way that depends upon object-given reasons. 
 Parfit claims that we have reasons to have certain telic desires, but that “these reasons 
are provided, not by the facts that these acts would fulfill or achieve these desires or aims, but 
by the features of what we want, or have as our aims.”(90) For example, using the case of 
future agony, when disallowing reasons that are generated in pursuit of this aim, according to 
Parfit, we must place a negative value upon agony in such a way that we have no reason to 
pursue agony, even though it is what we presently desire. This value cannot be subject-given 
since what is given by the subject is a desire to experience agony. Therefore this reason must 
be based upon facts about the nature of agony and our relation to it, which would then 
generate an object-given reason to try and avoid agony. 
If, according to Parfit, what we have reason to do is grounded in what we want, or what 
we have as our aims, then our reasons depend upon value-based object-given reasons at their 
core. If, however, as subjectivists claim, we can deliberate between certain desires that provide 
reasons, and those that don’t, then without appealing to a valuation of desires perhaps a 
subject-given foundation for normativity can be saved. Subjectivists claim that at the beginning 
of any chain of reasons generated through telic desires there is some desire which we have no 
further reason to have, and is valued for its own sake. Subjectivists adhere to a view of desires 
which attempts to establish value within desires themselves. If Parfit is correct this is 
unwarranted, and Subjectivists are unable to sufficiently respond to the challenge of ANA. I will 
argue in the next chapter that Parfit is incorrect, and that there is no plausible reason to deny 
subjectivist appeals to substantive rational desires. 
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Section 3: The Incoherence Argument 
The previous arguments, A and ANA, claim to show that subjective theories have 
implausible implications, and that subjectivists must admit that no desires give us reasons. 
Since, according to Parfit, Subjectivists must accept all desires as generating reasons (which 
would  render them unable to provide a satisfactory answer to the Humean problem), we must 
reject Subjective theories. Aside from the issues raised through The Agony, and All or None 
Arguments, there is, however, according to Parfit, another serious problem with subjective 
theories. The most plausible accounts of Subjectivism depend upon deliberation, and error-free 
desires, yet theories such as DT which depend upon fully informed error-free desires are 
incoherent.  
 Theories which rely upon deliberation and fully informed error-free desires are 
incoherent, according to Parfit, due to their reliance upon the rational consideration of certain 
facts. These theories, such as DT, depend upon substantive facts to determine what we have 
reason to do. Correct deliberation, in theories such as DT, is not possible without the re-
evaluation of what we have reason to do, according to what we would do if certain facts were 
taken into account. As Parfit claims, however, “when we are deciding which outcomes we shall 
try to bring about, we ought in important cases try to discover, and rationally consider, what 
these outcomes would be like. But if we make this claim, we are assuming that 
(O) these possible outcomes may have intrinsic features that 
would give us object-given reasons to want either to produce or 
to prevent these outcomes, if we can.  
 
And (O) is what Objectivists believe, Subjectivists deny (O).” (93-94) Therefore, according to 
Parfit, proponents of theories such as DT must accept the validity of some object-given reasons, 
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and in doing so must reject Subjectivism as incoherent. The incoherence of these theories is 
due to their assumption of both, 
(Q) our desires, aims, or choices give us reasons only if we would 
have these desires and aims, or make these choices, if we had 
true beliefs about all the relevant intrinsic features of what we 
want.  
 
 And that 
 
  (R) these features give us no reasons to want these things. (95) 
 
Theories such as DT, which deny object-given reasons (R), but yet are dependent upon 
facts to provide reasons for acting which we don’t currently desire (Q), are incoherent since, 
according to Parfit, they must simultaneously maintain the truth of Q and R at all times. The 
necessitation of both Q and R by Subjectivists provides what Parfit calls, the Incoherence 
Argument against Subjectivism. (95) 
As provided in Chapter 1, DT is the most plausible form of Subjectivism due to its use of 
rational deliberation, and dependence upon fully informed error-free desires. Yet, the very 
requirements of rational deliberation, and fully informed error-free desires renders Subjective 
theories as incoherent, according to Parfit. The Incoherence is a result of the apparent need for 
fully-informed deliberation, which coincides with the claim 
(M)  what we have most reason to do is whatever would best 
fulfill, not our actual present telic desires or aims, but the desires 
or aims that we would now have, or would want ourselves to 
have, if we knew and had rationally considered all of the relevant 
facts. (93) 
 
 The incoherence that results from deliberative theories such as DT is from the reliance 
upon facts to inform desires. The reliance upon facts in our deliberative processes acts against 
DT since in reality it confers value upon facts in such a way that value is derived from those 
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facts, and not desires, as DT claims. According to Parfit, theories such as DT have a much 
‘subtler’ problem; they rely on the very types of value-based objective reasons which they 
argue against. Formulations of Subjectivism, such as, the Desire-Based Theory and the Telic 
Desire Theory fail, according to Parfit, since they cannot account for how we decide between 
which desires provide reasons, and those that don’t. Theories such as DT avoid the inability to 
differentiate between desires, but in doing so, Parfit contends that they appeal to object-given 
reasons, and therefore admit the very types of reasons which they are set against. As Parfit 
claims,  
When many Subjectivists appeal to claims about what we would 
want or choose if we knew all the facts about the possible 
outcomes of our acts, these people rightly assume that these 
outcomes may have reason-giving features. Most of these people 
assume, for example, that we have object-given reasons to want 
to be happy, and to avoid agony. These people are not really 
Subjectivists. (96) 
 
Therefore, according to Parfit, theories such as DT are incoherent because they are 
fundamentally dependent upon object, not subject, given reasons. This, Parfit claims, 
undermines Subjective theories in the most fundamental way, since it shows that even 
Subjectivists are not able to plausibly claim dependence upon subject-given reasons. 
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CHAPTER 5: A DEFENSE OF SUBJECTIVE NORMATIVITY 
Section 1: The Categorical Necessity of Desires 
 Through a systematic analysis of the various forms of Subjectivism, Parfit concludes that 
Subjective theories fail to generate normativity, and therefore must be false. This conclusion is 
reached by enhancing the simplest subjective theories, such as, the Desire-Based Theory, Telic 
Desire Theory, Error-Free Desire Theory, and Informed Desire Theory which results in the 
acceptance of DT as the most plausible formulation of subjectivism. DT is proffered as the most 
coherent and viable form of Subjectivism and it is upon this formulation that Parfit presents his 
most scathing critiques. In this chapter I will present a multifaceted defense of both DT and 
Subjective normativity in general, and show that the critical limitations which Parfit diagnoses 
Subjectivist theories as containing do not exist.  
   The critical limitations which appear to destabilize Subjective theories are not focused 
solely upon DT, but rather on Subjective justifications of any kind, as such, due to the wide-
ranging nature of Parfit’s critique, I will first address the claims about  subjective reasons, which 
were addressed in Chapter 1, followed by the specific issues raised in addressing DT. Many of 
the challenges against subjective reasons will inherently lead to a discussion of DT, but since 
several of them do not necessitate an appeal to DT it will be helpful to examine them on their 
own merits.  
Parfit contends that the most pernicious issue within normative theories which depend 
upon subject-given reasons is the inability for desire based-theories to appeal to substantive 
rationality. Yet, there is a deeper problem, according to Parfit, which undermines all Subjective 
theories: namely that all desire based theories inherently depend upon object-given facts, and 
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as such are self-defeating. Parfit claims that when Subjectivists espouse normative force 
emanating from desires, it is due to their unknown adherence to the use of object-given facts. 
For example, when we consider the agent who is confronted with the poisonous snake, Parfit 
believes that normative force to not run is provided by facts alone. It is Parfit’s contention that 
an agent who is in possession of all of the facts will correctly choose to remain still, and this 
choice is normatively based solely within the knowledge of these facts. Parfit uses his 
explication of object-given reasons to claim that what we have normative reason to do depends 
exclusively upon these facts, and therefore it cannot be desires which provide reasons.  
 Yet, I believe that there is a critical flaw that is present within Parfit’s argument, the 
omission of motivational concerns. Parfit claims to derive normativity exclusively from facts, 
however, because he explains normativity in this way Parfit believes he is justified in dismissing 
motivational concerns.. As Parfit claims, “since I shall not be discussing why people act as they 
do, I shall say little about motivational reasons.”(37) However, since Parfit excludes a 
motivational component within normativity, the objective theory which he presents is unable 
to engage the internalism requirement. If Korsgaard is correct, as I believe she is, then practical 
reasons must be able to motivate us. Yet, Parfit has no account of how this may be possible 
since he admittedly does not find motivation to be an important demand of normativity.  
Due to Parfit’s lack of concern for motivational force, and thus the internalism 
requirement, in cases such as Snake, by only taking into account the relevant reason-implying 
facts the generation of normative force to not run is not possible. The facts alone provide the 
factual outcome of the different scenarios, i.e. that running will cause the snake to attack, and 
that standing still will result in the snake staying docile. Parfit presupposes that a rational agent 
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who possesses the facts that running will cause the snake to attack, thus implying death, and 
not running will cause the snake to remain docile, would necessarily conclude that the facts 
dictate in a strongly decisive way that the agent should not run. Yet the conclusion that the 
agent should not run is only possible if one presupposes that there is a fact that the agent 
should have the intention to live. If the agent desires to die then the facts of the snake’s 
disposition of only attacking moving objects would rationally compel the agent to run.  
Facts in themselves may only provide the agent with the relative knowledge of the 
different outcomes possible depending on which action the agent would choose. There is a fact 
that the snake will attack if the agent runs, and there is a fact that the agent will die if bitten. 
There is also a fact that not running will cause the snake to become docile and thus the agent 
will not die from the snake. These facts are merely those objective facts which provide the 
agent with an understanding of the consequences of either running or staying still. If the agent 
does not invoke some principle of action once he knows these objective facts, he will not be 
supplied with reasons for action. The reasons are only supplied once the agent has a principle 
for what would be best given the particular facts.   
Facts may provide knowledge of how one ought to act depending upon what one 
desires as an outcome, but without motivational reasons facts alone are impotent in generating 
reasons.  One of Parfit’s critiques against subjective theories is that subjective theories are 
incoherent because they depend upon an adherence to object-given reasons. Yet, Subjectivists 
can claim that the argument runs just as plausibly the other way. If an agent has strong 
motivation and desire to live, then this provides a reason to seek out those facts which will 
make this possible. It would be plausible to claim that the reason to not run is given by this 
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desire, and that the facts are merely procedural or instrumental means in accomplishing this 
desire.  
In order to respond to this objection, Parfit most likely would offer an account of the 
ways in which a fact can be good or bad. Parfit appeals to the idea of the good, which is meant 
to illuminate certain qualities about facts, which would give an agent reasons. 
When we call something,  
good, in what we can call the reason-implying sense we mean 
roughly that there are certain kinds of facts about this thing’s 
nature, or properties, that would in certain situations give us or 
others strong reasons to respond to this thing in some positive 
way, such as wanting, choosing, using, producing, or preserving 
this thing. (38) 
 
The properties which give us strong reasons to respond to a thing in a positive way 
would be seen as part of the very nature of what the thing provides to us. These properties 
must be seen as essential qualities of the thing in question, and are “good for us, in the sense of 
being in our interests, benefiting us, or contributing to our well-being.” (39) Those things which 
contribute to our well-being are “intrinsically” good for us since they are “the features of our 
lives in which our well-being consists…[and are]… the features that make our lives worth living.” 
(39) Since these properties would be an essential part of the thing, they would be seen as 
relevant reason-implying facts, and these facts would give us reasons, since they would 
generate a positive response to this thing for an agent.  
Let us return back to Snake. As said before, there are certain facts about the different 
actions an agent may perform. Parfit believes that when we add these facts to what is, “good 
for us,” these facts provide reasons for our acting in one way and not another. For Parfit, an 
agent which found himself in snake would have decisive reasons not to run since his well-being 
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would best be promoted through not being bitten. Thus, since not running would be best for 
the agent, this supplies a principle to guide the facts, and provides a decisive reason to not run.  
Again, though, Subjectivists can respond by claiming that the idea of the good which 
Parfit is depending upon is simply a subject-given value claim. Subjectivists may instead claim 
that what is good for us, and any corresponding reasons to respond to things in positive ways 
focus primarily upon types of motivation. Just as Parfit claims that subjectivists undermine their 
own accounts of reasons by appealing to facts, Subjectivists may claim that Parfit does the 
same in claiming that we ought to respond to certain facts such that we should want certain 
events to come about. It is unclear, however, why we should see facts as having the ability to 
provide the capacity to influence how we should “respond” to these facts, since Parfit does not 
believe that what is normative implies a motivational component. As Parfit claims, “object-
given value-based reasons cannot be regarded in such ways [linked with motivational 
concerns], since we have such reasons [to act] even if we would not be moved or motivated to 
act upon them.” (110)  
According to Parfit, facts provide reasons, but they do not necessitate motivation.  
Because of this, in cases such as Snake, the agent must correctly realize that he should not run, 
but he is, however, just as likely to be unmotivated to choose any particular course of action. By 
failing to necessitate motivational concerns Parfit not only fails to correctly involve the use of 
the internalism requirement, but due to this failure must in some way depend upon the use of 
desire. Since Parfit has no way to incorporate the internalism requirement, the only plausible 
way in which an agent could be moved to have a preference in regards to facts is to incorporate 
a desire for some potential thing or outcome. Yet, if Parfit incorporates desire in such a way 
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then in claiming that facts alone provide reasons, it seems that Parfit is using desires in a 
fundamental way, much like he claims Subjectivists depend upon facts.  
The inability of Parfit’s account of normativity to appeal to motivational concerns does 
not inherently undermine his claim that normativity is provided solely through object-given 
facts, but, it does invalidate Parfit’s specific account of reasons. Because, on Parfit’s account, 
normativity has no bearing upon moral motivation, it appears as though he is dependent upon 
desire in a fundamental way, since he is unable to satisfy the internalism requirement through 
facts alone. Thus Subjectivists can argue that just as they may be dependent upon facts, Parfit is 
equally obliged to fundamentally incorporate desires.  
Parfit’s lack of concern for motivation renders his form of objectivism as severely 
weakened when the Incoherence Argument is directed at his own theory, but as claimed this 
only renders Parfit’s own objective account flawed. By itself it is not a sufficient defense of 
Subjectivism. Instead, a more robust defense must be provided, one which is found through an 
analysis of DT, as well as the Agony, and All or None arguments. Since many of the most potent 
claims leveled against subjective theories are aimed at DT, and it is consequently only through 
DT that Subjectivists can mount a sufficient response to Parfit, I will turn now to DT.    
The strongest and allegedly the most destructive objection which Parfit directs at 
Subjective theories, and in particular DT, is that substantive appeals are only possible when we 
take into account object-given facts. Although Subjectivists can appeal to procedural rationality, 
and this can provide instrumental reasons to perform certain actions, normative force, 
according to Parfit, can only be generated through the use of substantively rational 
deliberation. Since, as Parfit claims, substantive rationality is inaccessible to Subjectivists, and 
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specifically Deliberative Subjectivists, normativity cannot be generated through subject-given 
reasons, and thus we should reject Subjectivism as false. I believe, however, that a more 
expansive defense of subject-given reasons is possible, and that this defense can provide a 
plausible account of normativity generated exclusively out of procedural rationality. With this 
robust defense Parfit’s criticisms of subjectivism should be seen as unable to invalidate 
subjective theories.  
In his denial of subject-given reasons, Parfit addresses the claims of Rawls, Williams, and 
Smith, among others, and attempts to show that they are unable to qualify their own 
conceptions of normativity through the use of substantive rationality. It is my contention that 
Parfit is mistaken in his view that what subjectivists are able to accomplish through deliberative 
appeals is severely limited. I shall also argue that through the deliberative theories of Rawls, 
Williams, and Smith, subjectivists can provide a plausible, non-objectively formulated account 
of normativity. 
Although Parfit claims that substantive rationality is not open to subjectivists, since 
substantive rationality must depend upon object-given facts, I contend that this view of 
substantive reasons is flawed since it conflates object-given reasons with categorical 
necessitation (which, as I will argue shortly, is something subjectivists can account for). Parfit 
depends upon an implicit assumption that object-given reasons are categorical demands placed 
upon agents, and that these demands, because they are object-given, are closed to 
subjectivists. According to Parfit, these categorical demands are only open to object based 
theories since they depend upon the use of substantive rationality.  
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As already presented, according to Parfit, substantive rationality is distinct from its 
procedural counterpart, since it places emphasis upon what we choose, whereas procedural 
rationality is limited to how we make our choices. Due to this difference in how reasons are 
generated, Parfit claims we can use this distinction to show that subjective theories are 
implausible at best, and at worst wholly incapable of generating reasons.  
If we return to the Agony Argument, and Parfit’s claim that even after ideal deliberation 
we may conceive of an agent who has no desire to avoid future agony, I believe that there are 
two highly plausible responses which may be given in defense of subjective theories: first, that 
the agent who undergoes ideal deliberation is incapable of being indifferent to future periods 
of agony, and second, that in responding to this argument, contrary to Parfit’s objection, 
subjectivists can generate reasons about future events without appealing to object-given 
reasons. Through an analysis of these two claims, I will claim that it is possible to generate 
subjectively given categorical demands upon rationality, which satisfy the concerns of what we 
choose, and yet nevertheless are derived through procedural rationality alone, and are thus 
purely subject-given.  
The view of subject-given reasons which Parfit provides is one which cannot escape the 
implausible implications of the Humean problem. Through the Agony Argument and  All or 
None Arguments Parfit argues that DT, which is the best subjective theory,  provides little to no 
further help for Subjectivists when confronted with the Humean problem, since substantive 
rationality is not open to proponents of DT. According to Parfit, to satisfy the Agony Argument 
we must appeal to value-based claims, which is not possible for subjectivists, and thus we must 
either accept that (1) we have a reason to be in future agony, or (2) that the desire for future 
78 
 
agony does not generate reasons. If we accept (1), we run against our pre-analytic intuition for 
the need to avoid agony; yet, if we accept (2), then we must accept the All or None Argument, 
and thus claim that if some desires generate reasons, then all desires do, or rather, in this case 
that if some desires do not generate reasons, than none do.  
 Parfit’s denial of subjective theories depends solely upon the inability of these theories 
to provide any possible route through which substantive object-given facts may be employed. I 
believe, however, that there is a functionally equivalent subject-given route which Parfit does 
not consider, and which can be inserted in place of substantive rationality, because uniformed 
necessary desires are required of all rational agents (of which agony plausibly seems to be).  
Admittedly, Parfit dismisses this possibility, claiming instead that although some 
Subjectivists might argue that “there would be some telic desires that everyone must have, 
because without these desires these people could not even be rational agents…such claims are 
irrelevant.” (77) These claims, according to Parfit, are ‘irrelevant’ since they are actually 
dependent upon desires which people have object-given reasons to have. Parfit’s claim, 
however, limits the ability to appeal to any plausibly coherent sense of human psychology, or 
even a moderately understandable account of desire, and as such, I believe we ought to reject 
this analysis.  
In describing a plausible account of normativity, or any account of reasons, we must 
assume at least some basic elements of agency upon which to operate. At the very least, some 
account of rationality seems to be one of these elements, and this seems to be a foundational 
component for many of the most acceptable moral theories. If we accept rational deliberation 
as the foundation for the basis of normativity (which, I believe, Parfit is willing to accept) then 
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we must explicate the characteristics of this deliberation which give power to generate 
normativity. Subjectivists claim that there are procedural rules, which when adhered to, and 
combined with desires, allow for an acceptable account of ideal deliberation. Objectivists, such 
as Parfit, however, claim that ideal deliberation must also incorporate object-given substantive 
appeals, and thus subjective theories are inadequate. Yet, I believe that Objectivists overvalue 
the use of substantive rationality, as well as object-given facts, and thus fail to realize to what 
extent procedural rationality can, in a simpler and more accessible way, play the role of object-
given facts in Objectivism. 
As I previously claimed, I believe that much of the apparent strength of the Agony, and 
All or None arguments, lies in the implicit (albeit mistaken) assumption that like object-given 
facts, categorical demands of rationality are also inaccessible to subjectivists. Parfit rejects 
Williams’ appeal to prudence as irrelevant, and Smith’s claim that rational desires need to fit a 
coherent and unified desiderative profile due to its dependence upon object-given facts. The 
dismissal of categorical demands placed upon subject-given rationality is, however, I believe, 
unwarranted.  
Human rationality must have not only demands, but also practical limitations placed 
upon it if it is to satisfy any logical account of what we consider to be reasonable. One of the 
most plausible limitations that ought to be seen as necessary is, as Bernard Williams says, “that 
an agent is committed in general to acting in the light of sound information, simply by being a 
rational agent; included in the S of every rational agent is a desire not to fail through error.”31 
Parfit rejects this claim as irrelevant when examining agony by claiming that the desire to avoid 
                                                            
31 Williams, Philosophy as Humanistic Discipline, 111. 
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future agony is not the type of desire such that it must be a member of S (an agent’s subjective 
motivational set) of every rational agent. This claim by Parfit’s is mistaken, however, for two 
reasons: first, agony, as it should be properly understood, is necessarily a desire that rational 
agents wish to avoid, and second, when subjectivists make this claim they may do so from a 
purely procedural account, and do not need to invoke object-given facts.  
Through an analysis of Williams’ claim that we must desire to not fail through error it is 
possible to see that a desire to avoid agony is analogously a categorical demand of procedural 
reason. When using procedural rationality, in order to correctly determine what procedure or 
rule is needed to accomplish whatever task we may have, we must be able to correctly assess 
what outcomes our actions will produce. Through the use of fully informed rational deliberation 
we can understand that, all things being equal, when we are determining which procedures are 
needed, and we base our reasons exclusively upon this deliberation, we are only appealing to 
procedural rationality. If we view procedural rationality in this way, we can see why Williams 
believes that the desire to not fail through error is a necessary desire included in the S of all 
rational agents. If an agent had some desire, it would undermine our ability to see this agent as 
rational if they desired to fail in accomplishing to bring about the thing which they desired. It is 
not logically coherent to claim that we can both desire some outcome, and yet also wish to fail 
to satisfy this desire through error, since this equates to wishing that we did not fulfill the very 
desire we wished to fulfill. For example, it is incoherent to claim that I both desire to score well 
on an evaluation, and also to fail to score well on that evaluation due to some error on my part. 
These two desires are rationally opposed to each other, and if I adhere to one I would have to 
fail to adhere to the other. Therefore it seems that Williams’ demand placed upon procedural 
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rationality, that we must desire not to fail through error, is a categorical demand of all rational 
agents, because if this does not hold true, it is unclear how any agent could be claimed to be 
rational.  
I believe that at this point it is possible to see that there is also a demand of prudential 
considerations placed upon the desires of rational agents. Since we must desire not to fail 
through error, we must desire that, when possible, we try prudently to actualize those things 
which we desire. If this is true, then I believe that we can include the desire to avoid future 
agony as one of these prudential considerations. If we examine what characteristics agony 
consists of then we should see this is a fairly evident demand of rationality. Agony is a physical 
or mental state that a particular agent has a strong aversion to, and by physical necessity 
strongly desires to avoid. Any physical or mental state which an agent has this strong negative 
correlative response to may be claimed to be a state of agony. Now, if we understand that 
agony is that state which an agent has such a strong natural aversion to, and thus desires to not 
experience, then it seems quite obvious that no fully informed rational agent could have a 
future desire to be in this state, and that this requirement is provided by procedural rationality 
alone. If, by definition, agony is a physical or mental state which an agent has a strong aversion 
to, and in fact, a desire to avoid, then no agent who is fully informed could wish to bring this 
state about. Since a fully informed agent would know that this future state is agony, and that 
agony is a desire which they strongly desire to not experience, they could not desire to 
experience that which they desire not to experience.  
The desire to avoid future agony, when possible, must be a categorical demand of 
reason. If we know that some future event will be agony for us, and we also know that agony is, 
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by definition, that which we desire to not experience, through a process of procedural 
rationality we can determine that we cannot desire to experience future agony, since this 
would cause a conflict in our rational process. If one of the demands of procedural rationality is 
that we follow procedural rules, and in desiring future agony we are both desiring that A come 
about, and that not A come about, we must claim that a desire for future agony violates the 
fundamental rule of consistency in our deliberation. We must instead reject the notion that an 
agent who is procedurally rational can have a present or future desire to be in agony.  
Parfit would reject this conclusion since he believes that even ideal deliberation does 
not necessarily provide us with desires for future states of affairs. Parfit asks us to consider, 
Case One, I know that some future event would cause me to have 
some period of agony. Even after ideal deliberation, I have no 
desire to avoid this agony. Nor do I have any other desire or aim 
whose fulfillment would be prevented either by this agony, or by 
my having no desire to avoid this agony. (74) 
 
Parfit claims that the only plausible defense that can be given in support of Case One is “that 
facts about our future desires give us reasons.” (74) But, since this defense depends upon 
future facts it is a value-based objective theory, and thus by definition not open to subjectivists. 
Therefore, since Parfit rejects the possibility of agony being a categorical demand of rationality, 
he thinks that when subjectivists attempt to provide reasons to avoid future agony they are 
appealing to substantive rationality, and thus invoking object-based reasons.  
This contention by Parfit, however, misrepresents and confuses the procedural value of 
DT. An agent who undergoes ideal deliberation can never lack the desire to avoid either present 
or future agony. Parfit defines ideal deliberation as “fully informed and procedurally rational 
deliberation,”(63) but denies any capacity for our future desires to generate reasons. Yet, if we 
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accept Parfit’s definition of ideal deliberation, there is no impetus to appeal to substantive 
rationality, since Case One is clearly impossible under ideal deliberation. If an agent if fully 
informed about all present and future eventual outcomes, and knows that some choice will 
lead to agony, then he would necessarily desire to avoid this state. If agony is simply the 
presence of some state which we do not want to be in, and we are fully informed, then it is a 
demand of procedural rationality that we would do that which would keep us from being in 
that state. If an agent were fully informed, and yet, still desired to be in agony, then this agent 
would desire to be in a state which he simultaneously does not want to be in, and thus there is 
an inherent contradiction, which sufficiently undermines his ability to be seen as a rational 
agent. Therefore properly understood the agent has a reason to cause it to come about that he 
not be in agony, and this reason is supplied exclusively by his subject-given desires in 
conjunction with procedural rationality.  
Procedural rationality, as Parfit claims, only appeals to how we make our choices, and 
because it does not appeal to what we choose, Parfit believes, by itself, procedural rationality 
cannot provide normativity. (62) But, as I argue, how we choose is the only criterion that 
subjectivists must appeal to in claiming the categorical necessitation of the desire to avoid all 
present and future agony. Since agony is simply a physical or mental state which we desire to 
not be in, any agent who undergoes a process of ideal deliberation necessarily has reasons to 
avoid any agony. These reasons, contrary to Parfit’s claim, are derived from the use of 
procedural rationality and fully informed desires. Because of this, I believe that we can reject 
the Agony Argument and this undermines the soundness of Parfit’s second premise, 
“Subjectivism implies that we have no reasons [to want to avoid all future agony].” (76)  
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Section 2: A Robust Defense of Ideal Deliberation 
The Agony Argument fails because the desire to avoid agony is categorically demanded 
of all rational agents. I believe that since we can plausibly claim that there is at least one such 
demand upon rational agents, then we might presume there are others, and thus we may claim 
in at least some capacity that there are subject-given reasons generated through categorically 
necessary desires.  
 The response above provides a defense of subject-given reasons which avoids the 
implausible implications of the Agony Argument. There are, however, two more critical 
objections which Parfit levels against deliberative subjective theories; first, that the Humean 
problem is insufficiently satisfied through deliberation (as seen through the All or None 
Argument), and that subjectivist fundamentally depend upon object-given facts, and thus 
subjective theories are incoherent (the Incoherence Argument). If, however, we return to the 
theories presented in Chapter 3, I believe that both of these challenges may be met in a 
plausible manner, and in such a way that appeals only to procedurally subject-given reasons.  
 When we combine Williams’ notion of deliberative priority with that of Smith’s concept 
of categorical necessitation, we can further accommodate Smith’s dependence upon systematic 
justification. When this combination is coupled with a reflective process, such as, Rawls’ 
reflective equilibrium, we may claim the generation of normative reasons which are dependent 
solely upon our desires and procedural rationality. The resulting theory which combines these 
principles is one which adopts and modifies Parfit’s concept of ideal deliberation, provides a 
highly plausible account of reasons, and further, avoids any use of substantive rationality.  
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 As presented in Chapter 3, Williams believes that we can assign deliberative priority to 
desires by correctly using his four point argument. Any desires which satisfy these conditions 
are able to satisfy the internalism requirement, which as shown by Korsgaard, is a necessary 
component of plausible accounts of normativity. The argument which Williams presents is 
dependent upon fully informed desires along with procedural rationality. (i) and (ii)  claim that 
all desires which are informed by false beliefs do not generate reasons, whereas (iii) elaborates 
upon the types of falsifications provided in (i) and (ii), and claims that beliefs which are either 
(a) untrue, or (b) ignorant of relevant information, are the specific types of beliefs which when 
informing our desires do not generate reasons. (i), (ii), and (iii) present the conditions of true 
belief, and thus provide the characteristics of fully informed desires. The last principle, (iv), on 
the other hand, is not aimed at what satisfies the requirements of desires being fully informed, 
but rather about our deliberation of those true beliefs given by (i), (ii), and (iii). (iv) is satisfied 
through the application of procedural rationality upon the internal desires which are generated 
through (i) through (iii). When we combine (i) through (iv) we are presented with a model of 
ideal deliberation which is seemingly identical to the one Parfit outlines: fully informed, and 
procedurally rational.  
 Williams’ account of rationality, which is also seen to be substantially used in Smith’s 
deliberative theory as well, presents a subject-given solution to the All or None Argument. Parfit 
contends, however, that since subjectivists cannot appeal to substantive rationality, they are 
unable to claim that some desires generate reasons while others do not. Therefore, according 
to Parfit, subjectivists cannot avoid the Humean problem without appealing to object-given 
reasons. This contention is false, however; those desires which depend upon false, or ignorant 
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beliefs, do not generate reasons since they oppose the desires which we would have if we were 
fully informed. Through the use of fully informed deliberation Williams believes that we can 
avoid the claims of the All or None Argument. However, it is the very use of fully informed 
deliberation which provides Parfit with his most substantial critique of subjectivism, and upon 
which all three of the arguments presented depend. The All or None Argument, the Agony 
Argument, and all other critiques of subjectivism which Parfit raises, only go through if the 
Incoherence Argument is correct in its claim that subjectivists inherently depend upon object-
given facts. Therefore I will devote the final analysis of subjective theories to the task of 
showing that the Incoherence Argument fails to motivate a substantial devaluation of 
Subjectivity. 
  The Incoherence Argument is the most substantial argument against subjective theories 
proposed by Parfit, since it is upon the claims drawn from this argument that all other 
challenges Parfit presents against subjectivism are dependent. If Subjective theories can 
generate normativity without substantive rationality, and thus object-given facts, then the 
Incoherence, Agony, and All or None arguments are all incapable of undermining subjective 
normativity.  
 Subject-based theories are limited to the ways in which we make our choices, but, as I 
have argued, there are necessary constraints placed upon the choices of any rational agent. As 
previously shown, when we are using a process of ideal deliberation, we must utilize Williams’ 
concept of deliberative priority. Deliberative Priority is necessary for Subjective theories, since 
it allows for the internalization of the desires which we would have if we were fully informed. 
These internalized, fully informed desires allow subjectivists to claim the normative power of 
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some desires while rejecting others, as non-normative. Therefore through the use of ideal 
deliberation, subjectivists can formulate a plausible response to the Humean Problem, and thus 
avoid the Agony Argument.  
 There is, however, according to Parfit, an inability for subjectivists to use ideal 
deliberation in subject-given accounts of normativity, since fully informed deliberation depends 
upon object, not subject-given reasons, and this undermines subjectivism from the outset. 
Through the Incoherence Argument Parfit claims that all appeals to fully informed mental or 
physical states, are actually appeals to the facts which provide these states, and thus are 
dependent on relative reason implying facts, and therefore not subject-given. Although I have 
argued previously that in certain regards the Incoherence Argument can plausibly run the other 
way as well, I believe that there is a more substantial response which subjectivists can provide 
that is given exclusively through procedural rationality.  
 Subjectivism is incoherent, according to Parfit, since it must use fully informed 
deliberation to avoid the Humean problem, and in doing so necessitates the use of object-given 
facts. This, however, is false. Subjective theories necessitate the use of three concepts in 
providing reasons, namely desires, procedural rationality, and pre-analytic moral intuitions, and 
these should be seen as corresponding respectively with deliberative priority, the unity of 
desires, and reflective equilibrium.  
 It has already been shown how Williams’ notion of deliberative priority fits into the 
structure of ideal deliberation. Deliberative priority provides the framework in which we can 
understand desires as generating reasons in some instances and yet incapable of normativity in 
others. So we can loosely view deliberative priority as giving the foundation for subjective 
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normativity, but we must incorporate Smith’s account of the unity of desires and systematic 
justification, which will then necessitate the use of Rawls’ reflective equilibrium, in order to 
understand how we can avoid the claim that the fully informed nature of ideal deliberation is 
object-given.  
 If procedural rationality is able to provide us with the necessary components of 
normativity without appealing to object-given reasons, it must incorporate desire in such a way 
that our rational deliberation depends upon universal or categorical desires.32 Subjective 
theories must produce plausible examples of necessary desires incumbent upon all rational 
agents, because if they fail in this task, then subjective theories must depend upon categorical 
demands of another kind; relevant reason-implying facts. I believe that the desire to avoid 
agony, whenever possible, is, however, one such desire, as already stated, and as I have already 
shown, this desire seems to be a desire that is not, as Parfit claims, dependent upon object-
given reasons. If we use Parfit’s definition of rationality, and claim that “our desires are not 
rational, and are in the old phrase contrary to reason, when we want some event that we have 
reasons not to want,” (56) we can see that a desire for future agony is irrational.  
                                                            
32 My use of the concept of categorical desires is in significant ways different than that of the subjective thinkers 
which I address, such as, that of Williams. In his paper, “Persons, character and morality” Williams presents a view 
of categorical desires which are categorical because they are necessary for an agent to remain alive. As Williams 
says, “Some desires are admittedly contingent on the prospect of one’s being alive, but not all desires can be in 
that sense conditional, since it is possible to imagine a person rationally contemplating suicide, in the face of some 
predicted evil, and if he decides to go on in life, then he is propelled forward into it by some desire (however 
general or incoherent) which cannot operate conditionally of his being alive, sense it settles the question of 
whether he is going to be alive. Such a desire we may call a categorical desire,” Williams, “Persons, Character and 
Morality,” 11.   
The view of categorical necessary desires which I use, in contrast to that of Williams’, claims that there are 
specific desires incumbent upon all agents, if we are to view them as rational agents. There may be corresponding 
categorical desires which are needed for us to have a possible future, but these are not my focus. Instead when I 
use the term categorical, I mean that there are certain desires, which, if we did not possess, would result in our 
failure to be acting rationally in any coherent sense, and thus would render us not only irrational, but incapable of 
claiming a plausible account of agency. 
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 The desire for future agony is irrational, like Parfit claims, but it is not because it is 
dependent upon object-given reasons, we need not appeal to anything other than Smith’s idea 
of categorical demands of rationality. If there are requirements of rationality, then it would 
seem an obvious one that desiring to be in a state which by its very definition is not a state 
which we can desire is irrational. With an understanding of at least this one categorical desire, 
we can then work to extrapolate derivative desires which must accompany the desire to avoid 
agony, and which are then unified under a common set. The way in which Smith views this 
process of unifying sets of desires is to apply a more general desire that “justifies and explains 
the more specific desires that we have.” (S159) As we attempt to unify desires under a more 
systematically justifiable set of desires, we imagine those desires that would be necessary for 
unity. This depends upon evaluative beliefs about what our desires would be if we were fully 
rational, and any desire that is acquired in this manner is done so “precisely because it is 
believed to be required for us to be rational.” (S160)  
 Therefore, the desires which we acquire through our evaluative beliefs are those which 
align with what we believe to be rational desires. This process of unity replaces the use of fully 
informed thought in ideal deliberation, since it appeals not to what some present or future 
facts tell us we should desire, but rather what we believe to be the desires which are most 
rational in a given situation. It may still be possible to insist upon fully informed desires, but this 
move makes it unnecessary, and actually seems to be more plausible for an actual account of 
reasons. If we can avoid an appeal to error-free, or fully informed desires, we can avoid the 
necessitation of substantive facts, since we do not need factual justification for our desires, but 
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rather only rational beliefs. Through a combination of procedural rationality, and evaluative 
beliefs we can generate normative reasons. 
 Admittedly, Objectivists, such as Parfit, will reject the theory of normativity outlined 
above, since if our evaluative beliefs are either false, based on ignorance, or lacking relevant 
facts, then they may give us reasons which do not align with those produced through fully 
informed desires. Because desires which are not fully informed may be influenced by the lack of 
relevant facts, and thus capable of being, if not contrary, then at least not in alignment with the 
desires which we would have if we were fully informed, Parfit thinks we should insist upon the 
fully informed demand of DT. However, I believe that Subjectivists can appeal to another claim 
which would allow for not only an explanation of how we can account for the lack of relevant 
facts, but allows us to avoid an appeal to fully informed desires, and thus Parfit’s most 
substantial critique of subjectivism.  
 The major flaw in the subjective theory which I have outlined above, is that, as it stands, 
there is no way to resolve the fact that desires which are formulated out of the lack of being 
fully informed may sometimes be contrary to the desires which we would have when 
influenced by all of the relevant reason-implying facts. This dependence upon relevant facts is, 
however, a need for the justification of objective theories. Subjective theories, contrarily, are 
not dependent upon facts. However, since subjective theories need not appeal to facts, they 
must justify a view of normativity which depends exclusively upon evaluative desires in 
conjunction with procedural rationality, and this is provided by Rawls’ notion of reflective 
equilibrium.  
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 Smith’s account of unity gives us the ability to claim categorical desires which can be 
derived through procedural rationality. Yet, because we also have other desires which are not 
categorical demands of reason, but are nevertheless unified under these categorical desires, we 
must have a way to justify reasons based upon these subsequent desires. The categorical 
demands of reason, such as the desire to avoid agony, when possible, are the same as those 
desires which we would have if fully informed. Yet, the desires which are unified under, such 
categorical desires, may however, change if we were fully informed, and so we need a principle 
which, derived exclusively from deliberation, may provide reasons.  
 Reflective equilibrium is just such a principle since it allows for a reflective justification 
of desires strictly through aligning those desires, or bringing them into with our pre-analytic 
moral intuitions. Parfit claims that we need to incorporate substantive rationality to avoid the 
possibility that we would have reasons, based upon desires, which cause events that are in fact 
bad for us. Since procedural rationality is concerned with how we choose, and Parfit believes 
we must also incorporate what we choose into normativity, he rejects subjective theories. 
Reflective equilibrium offers, however, a way for subjectivists to appeal to what we choose, yet 
purely in a procedurally rational way. Desires, which are generated through the procedural 
means sketched above, can be justified by examining what they demand in contrast to what we 
believe our pre-analytic moral intuitions demand of us.  
When we arrive at a unified set of desires, we can ask what this set asks of us, and then 
compare these demands with our basic intuitions. Since these intuitions are not based upon 
facts, but are themselves further based upon what we believe to be rationally required of us, 
we must appeal only to procedural rationality. But, when we enter into this reflective process 
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we do so by asking what our desires demand, and whether, when compared to our basic 
intuitions, if this seems like a rational demand. Therefore, in using reflective equilibrium as a 
metric guide to judge whether what we desire is rational, we satisfy the same criterion as that 
of substantive rationality, and yet avoid any necessitation of appeals to object-given reasons.  
By unifying desires as a cohesive set, we include only those desires which we believe to 
be rationally required of us, and further, we can internalize those desires through the process 
of ascribing deliberative priority. We would then have rational and motivational reasons to act 
upon the desires generated in this way, and we can then examine the desires in a given set, and 
check them against our basic intuitions and this allows us to further justify these desires based 
upon what they demand of us. 
 As I have claimed, I believe that subjectivists can rework DT in a significant way by 
rejecting the need for fully informed desire. This is justified, since we can adopt in its place the 
unity of desires under the categorical necessitation of basic desires. When we unify desires 
under these categorically required desires, and assign deliberative priority to sets of desires, we 
can generate subjective reasons which avoid the challenges of the Agony and All or None 
Arguments. The desires which are created in this way can then be examined and compared 
with our pre-analytic moral intuitions through a reflective process which seeks equilibrium 
between what our desires and moral intuitions demand of us. The process of reflective 
equilibrium allows us to remove the demand of substantive rationality, and allows us to refute 
the Incoherence Argument, since through this process there is no need for the use of object-
given facts. Therefore, we should reject the three arguments presented by Parfit, as well as the 
falsity of subjectivity which Parfit claims. Through the use of procedural rationality, pre-analytic 
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moral intuitions, and subject-given desires, subjectivists can provide a sufficiently plausible and 
coherent response to Parfit, and thus I believe negate the concerns raised by Parfit. 
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